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ATOMS FOR PEACE: 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENcrl 
Bernhard G. Bechhoefer* and Eric Stein** 
ON October 26, 1956 seventy states signed an international agreement described as the Statute of an International 
Atomic Energy Agency. This signing followed a conference of over 
a month in which eighty-two states participated.1 All of the par-
ticipating states supported the text which resulted from this 
conference-a truly remarkable result considering that the subject 
of the conference was atomic energy with its far-reaching inter-
national security implications. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency itself, when it comes 
into existence following ratification by the requisite number of 
states, in several respects will be unique among international 
organizations. In the first place, it combines two functions. It has 
the positive function of seeking "to accelerate and enlarge the 
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 
throughout the world."2 Also, it has the negative function of 
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Stanford Research Institute, 
Menlo Park, California, in the preparation of this article. The authors are indebted also 
to the University of Michigan Law School for providing research assistance. 
Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors and not neces-
sarily the views of any agency of the United States Government. 
• Foreign Service Officer detailed to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as Chief of Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency Branch, Division of International Affairs; A.B. 1925, 
Harvard College; LL.B. 1928, Harvard Law School; member, Minnesota Bar; from Novem-
ber 1954 to December 1955, Special Assistant to the United States Representative for Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations.-Ed . 
.. Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan; J.U.D. 1937, Charles University 
of Prague, Faculty of Law; J.D. 1942, University of Michigan; formerly of the Department 
of State, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the International Conference on Peace-
ful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva and to the United States Representative for Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations.-Ed. 
1 See Official Records of the 1956 Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the Statute), IAEA/CS/OR.39, p. 2, for the unani-
mous adoption of the statute. The text of the statute is contained in booklet form in 
IAEA/CS/13. For the list of the states which signed the statute see IAEA/CS/OR.40, 
pp. 11-15. 
2 Statute, art. II, first sentence. 
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insuring, "so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at 
its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such 
a way as to further any military purpose."3 
When President Eisenhower first launched the idea of the 
Agency in the United Nations on December 8, 1953, he indicated 
that one of its prime objectives should be to "begin to diminish 
the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles."4 
This envisioned utilizing the Agency to syphon off fissionable 
materials from wartime uses to peacetime uses.5 Thus one function 
aims at raising standards of living; the other is directly related to 
the overall problem of disarmament.6 
Another unusual feature of the Agency is that there will in 
fact be three different types of relationships between the Agency 
and its members. This is reflected in the statute, particularly in 
the provisions on the selection of the Board of Governors.7 The 
first type of relationship will apply to those members which now 
produce substantial quantities of fissionable materials;8 those 
states probably will not apply in the foreseeable future for any 
assistance whatsoever from the Agency.9 The second type of 
relationship will involve the states that have substantial quantities 
3 Statute, art. II, second sentence. 
4 U.N. GENERAL .AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 8th Session (1953), Plenary Meetings, AJPV.470, 
p. 443 at 452, par. 122. 
5 The same thought was repeated by Mr. Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission, in the International Conference on the Statute. He expressed 
the hope that the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency " ••• will divert 
important amounts of fissionable material from atomic bomb arsenals to the uses of benefit 
to mankind, and those amounts will steadily grow with the maintenance of peace. More 
tons of these materials will be devoted to welfare, fewer tons to weapons and warfare." 
IAEA/CO/OR.1, p. 11. However, see the United States note of May I, 1954 handed by 
Secretary of State Dulles to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov [in ATOMS FOR PEACE MAN-
UAL, S. Doc. No. 55, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 274 (1954)] to the effect that" ••• this proposal 
[for an international atomic energy agency] was not intended as a measure for the control 
of atomic weapons .•.• " 
6 For the position of the Soviet Union on the relation between negotiations for the 
Agency and disarmament negotiations, see Appendix A, Appendix G and footnotes 63 and 
109 infra • 
. 7 Statute, art. VI, par. A. For further discussion of. the Board, see p. 750 et seq. 
· s The statute defines fissionable materials in Art. XX as follows: 
"I. The term 'special fissionable material' means plutonium-239; uranium-233; 
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the 
foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to 
time determine; but the term 'special fissionable material' does not include source material. 
"2. The term 'uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233' means uranium containing 
the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of 
these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 
238 occurring in nature." Cf. the definition of "special nuclear material" in §2014(t) of 
the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 921, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) 
§2011 et seq. (P.L. No. 703, 83d Cong., 2d sess., August 1954). 
9 This group includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the U.S.S.R. 
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of "source material" (uranium and thorium)10 and therefore will 
be in a position to make contributions to the Agency as well as 
to receive benefits from the Agency.11 This same category would 
include countries such as Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands 
which have developed considerable technical skills in the field of 
atomic energy but lack, at the present time, source materials. The 
third type of relationship will involve those members that have 
neither technical skills nor source materials. These states con-
stituting most of the membership will derive benefits from the 
Agency but their contributions, if any, are likely to be much 
smaller than the benefits which they will derive. 
While the states in this third category received texts of the draft 
statute as early as August 1955 and made suggestions both in the 
the U.N. General Assembly and to the negotiating states, they 
did not participate directly in the negotiations until the con-
vening of the International Conference.12 Many of the changes 
in the statute made at the conference resulted from their sug-
gestions.13 
Three drafts emerged successively during the negotiations: 
I. The text of August 22, 1955 prepared by the initial 
negotiating group of eight states, referred to below as the eight-
power draft;14 
10 Art. XX of the statute defines "source material" in the following manner: 
"3. The term 'source material' means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes 
occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing 
in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material con-
taining one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall 
from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from 
time to time determine." Cf. the definition of "source material" in the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. m, 1956) §2014 (s). 
11 E.g., France, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Aus-
tralia. 
12 Ambassador Morehead Patterson, U.S. representative in the initial negotiating 
group, states in his Report to the President: 
"Many comments have been received either through communications to the State De-
partment or through statements made in the recent debate on this subject in the Tenth 
General Assembly. These comments indicate that differences in viewpoints as disclosed to 
date are mainly concentrated on a few points such as: a) composition and manner of 
selection of the Board of Governors of the Agency; b) relationship of the Agency to the 
United Nations; c) procedures for approval of the budget and prorating among States of 
operating expenses. The United States and the other negotiating States have sought to 
give full consideration to the viewpoints expressed by all of the States." 34 DEPT. OF STATE 
BuL. 5 at 6 (1956). 
13 The vast majority of the amendments to the statute offered at the International Con-
ference were proposed by these states. Approximately half of the amendments brought to 
vote at the Conference were adopted. For a list of amendments and their authors see 
IAEA/CS/INF.4jRev. I, dated October 3, 1956. 
14 Published in 33 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 666-672 (1955). 
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2. The text of April 18, 1956 prepared by the enlarged 
negotiating group of twelve states, referred to as the twelve-power 
draft;15 and 
3. The final text approved by the International Conference.16 
Separate and parallel negotiations were carried on between 
the United States and the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union 
joined in the negotiating group of twelve in November 1955.17 
Membership 
The initial membership of the Agency is limited to states 
which are members of the United Nations or of any of the 
specialized agencies which sign the statute within the specified 
period and ratify it.18 As a practical matter, all states are eligible 
for initial membership excepting the Chinese Communist regime, 
North Korea, East Germany, Outer Mongolia and Viet Minh. 
These regimes are now members neither of the United Nations 
nor of any of the specialized agencies. States other than the initial 
members may become members "after their membership has been 
approved by the General Conference upon the recommendation 
of the Board of Governors. "19 
Organs of the Agency 
The Agency has three organs: the General Conference com-
posed of all members,20 the Board of Governors21 and the staff 
headed by a director general.22 The negotiators at an early stage 
concluded that in distributing responsibility among these three 
organs, the Board of Governors would be given preponderant 
authority.23 This conclusion was due to the fact that the great 
15 Annex III of the Report of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Doc. 31, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1956; also 
IAEA/CS/3, September 10, 1956, as corrected by IAEA/CS/3/Corr. 1 and IAEA/CS/3/Corr. 2. 
16 See note 1 supra. 
17 See Appendix A below. 
18 Statute, art. IV, par. A. The statute was opened for signature on October 26, 1956. 
Statute, art. XXI, par. A. 
19 Statute, art. IV, par. B. This provision also applies to members of the United Nations 
or one of the specialized agencies which have not signed the statute within ninety days after 
it was opened for signature. See Appendix B. 
20 Statute, art. V. 
21 Statute, art. VI. 
22 Statute, art. VII. 
23 See the remarks of Mr. Morehead Patterson in his Report, 34 DEPT. OF STATE BUL 
5 at 6 (1956): "It was clear that the membership as a whole could not deal with the day-to-
day technical problems which would confront the Agency. Therefore, we provided in the 
Statute for a Board of Governors with broad authority to make most of the necessary 
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bulk of contributions to the Agency would come from the very 
few states that had fissionable materials or large resources of 
uranium. These states, which were the only negotiators of the 
earlier drafts, were sure to play a large role on the Board of 
Governors. As the group of negotiating states broadened, the 
powers of the General Conference vis-a-vis the Board of Governors 
have increased. This was in response to the strong views expressed 
by many states, particularly in the General Assembly and the In-
ternational Conference.24 
From the very outset of the negotiations, the General Con-
ference was given control over the purse strings.25 The budget of 
the Agency required the approval of the General Conference. 
Among the additional powers granted to the General Con-
ference at the recent International Conference is the authority to 
make "decisions" (as distinguished from recommendations) on 
matters referred to it by the Board.26 If this amounts to a delegation 
decisions for the Agency. The membership -as a whole =- describedin the Statute as the 
General Conference - maintains its control over the Board of Governors through election 
of a number of its members and through complete control over the purse." 
See also the 8-power draft, which already provided (in art. VII, par. H),,"The Board 
of Governors shall be charged with complete authority to carry out the functions of and 
determine the policies of the Agency in accordance with the present Statute subject to its 
responsibilities to the General Conference. . . ." 
24 Already in the debates in the Ninth General Assembly (in 1954) some delegations 
called for increased participation by underdeveloped countries in the drafting of the statute. 
E.g., Mr. Barrington (Burma) said that "it was to be regretted that Asia and Latin America 
had not been called upon to take part in the organization of the international agency .... " 
U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 9th Session (1954), First Committee, A/C.I/SR.723, 
p. 371 at 372. Similar objections were made by Mr. Menon (India). Id., A/C.l/SR.725, 
p. 381. Increased representation of the "have-nots" on the proposed board as well as in 
the negotiations was advocated by a number of countries in the Tenth General Assembly 
(1955). See particularly Syria, U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 10th Session (1955), 
First Committee, A/C.l/SR.764, p. 39 at 43; Indonesia, id., A/C.I/SR.765, p. 45 at 47; 
Israel, id., A/C.1/SR. 765, p. 45 at 48; Liberia, id., A/C.l/SR.766, p. 53 at 55; India, id., 
A/C.l/SR.768, p. 63 at 65. The Indonesian representative said: "I have already cautioned 
against repeating the inequalities of the earlier industrial revolution, with its sharp divi-
sion between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', between the producers of manufactured goods 
and the suppliers of raw materials ..•. It is our sincere hope that the governing body 
of the agency will, in the first place, be founded on the principle of equitable geographic 
distribution. This means, naturally, that the Asian, African and Latin American Con-
tinents must be adequately represented on this body." Id., A/C.l/PV.765, pp. 22-23. In 
regard to the position of the underdeveloped countries see also William R. Frye, "Atoms 
for Peace: 'Haves' Vs. 'Have-Nots'" in 35 FOREIGN Poucv BUL. 41 (1955) . 
.25 See art. VI, par. D, subpar. 5, and art. XVI of the eight-power draft; art. V, par. D. 
subpar. 5, and art. XIV of the twelve-power draft. 
26 Statute, art. V, par. F, subpar. I. This provision was part of an Indonesian-Pakis-
tanian amendment (IAEA/CS/Art. V/Amend. 8). Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan) stated: "This 
amendment has been submitted with the idea of giving greater authority to the General 
Conference within the scope of the present statute. . • • If • • • there is any matter on 
which the Board of Governors is unable to arrive at a decision or on which it may definitely 
and explicitly want the opinion or the decision of the General Conference, then we 
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of decision-making authority it may be of practical importance 
particularly in the event of the inability of the Board to decide 
upon a course of action. The General Conference was also given 
the authority to "discuss any questions or any matters within the 
scope of this Statute or relating to the powers and functions 
of any organs provided for in this Statute, and may make recom-
mendations to . the membership of the Agency or to the Board 
of Governors or to both on any such questions or matters.''27 This 
language follows closely article 10 of the United Nations Charter 
concerning the powers of the United Nations General Assembly. 
While the Board of Governors still makes final decisions on most 
matters and while the powers of the General Conference are 
confined to those expressly granted to it in the statute, neverthe-
less, this authority of the General Conference to make recom-
mendations is significant. The Board of Governors is certain to 
give the greatest weight to the recommendations of the General 
Conference. The legislative history raises some doubt whether 
the authority to make "recommendations to the membership" 
means only general recommendations applicable to all members 
or whether it includes also specific recommendations directed to 
an individual member. The authority to make recommendations 
of the latter type would provide a rather powerful means of 
pressure on individual members.28 
think that instead of the present phraseology, the General Conference should be author-
ized to take decisions on those matters which are specifically referred to it by the Board.'' 
IAEA/CS/OR.18, p. 46. Mr. Surjotjondro (Indonesia) remarked that " ••• the insertion 
.•• will add a very useful constitutional provision for a matter which we are justified 
in anticipating will come up in the course of the operation of the agency.'' IAEA/CS/OR.19, 
p.9. 
This amendment was adopted by 63 votes to l, with 14 abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.22, 
p. 46. 
27 Statute, art. V, par. D. This addition also originated in the amendment proposed 
at the Conference by Indonesia and Pakistan. IAEA/CS/Art. V/Amend. 8. In regard to 
this amendment Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) said: " ... [W]e recognize that perhaps 
the arrangements in the Agency should be brought a little more closely into line with 
those which now apply to the United Nations as a whole." IAEA/CS/OR.18, p. 38. The 
Pakistanian representative remarked: "This paragraph • • . is taken from the Charter 
of the United Nations where the powers of the General Assembly vis-a-vis the special 
organs of the United Nations are defined. • • • By the introduction of this new paragraph, 
the powers of the General Conference ••• would be widened.'' IAEA/CS/OR.18, pp. 44-45. 
The Czechoslovak representative remarked: "Views that the General Conference should 
be an organ with decisive authority in matters concerning the Agency's activities have been 
expressed by many Governments in their comments on the original draft, as well as in the 
opening statements of many delegations at our Conference.'' IAEA/CS/OR.18, p. 41. The 
amendment was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 4 abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 42. 
28 The importance of this new wording seems to lie in the power to make recom-
mendations to the membership of the Agency, because the former art. V, par. E, subpar. l, 
of the 12-power draft had already provided for the power "to make recommendations to 
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This increase in the powers of the General Conference29 as 
the negotiations progressed30 is reminiscent of the United Nations 
where the authority of the General Assembly was considerably 
increased at the San Francisco conference in contrast to the 
original Dumbarton Oaks proposals worked out by the great 
powers with emphasis upon the functions of the Security Council.31 
the Board of Governors on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency.'' Emphasis 
added. (The phrasing "within the scope of this Statute or relating to the powers and func-
tions of any organs" does not seem to differ substantially from "relating to the functions 
of the Agency.'') 
The amendment in its original form used the words "to the members.'' Emphasis 
added. Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) argued against this on the ground that a situa-
tion should be avoided in which the General Conference would make recommendations 
to individual member states which were in conflict with arrangements made by the Board, 
and that therefore the term "membership" rather than "members" should be used. See 
IAEA/CS/OR.18, p. 38. The Mexican representative said: "As we understand it, the United 
Kingdom representative proposes that the General Conference should be given authority 
to address recommendations to the members of the Agency as a whole, and not to an 
individual member or group of members. If that understanding is correct, the result, in 
our opinion, would be to restrict the powers and functions of the General Conference. The 
provision would lose any practical value." IAEA/CS/OR.19, p. 17. The Chairman of the 
Conference stated before the amendment was brought to vote: "I understand that the 
sponsors of this amendment will accept the proposed substitution of the words 'to the 
membership' for the words 'to the members'.'' IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 41. 
29 See Appendix C below. 
so This progress is described by Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) in the following 
manner: 
"I would point out to the Committee that the original draft of this statute, which was 
circulated in August 1955, gave the Board of Governors a very large degree of direct re-
sponsibility, not only in carrying out, but in initiating and approving the policies to be 
followed by the Agency •. A number of countries criticized this arrangement because they 
felt that on certain broad matters of policy affecting the actions of the Board they should 
be more closely subordinated to the over-all direction of the General Conference. The 
twelve-power negotiating group, at its meeting in March of this year, took these criticisms 
very seriously, and, although I will not enumerate them here, a number of very substan-
tial changes were made to meet the views expressed. • • • [T]he article as it now stands 
describes reasonably satisfactorily the relative field of responsibility of the Board and the 
General Conference. To try to give the General Conference the attributes of the executive 
organ of the Agency, for which by its very nature it is not fitted, would, in view of my 
delegation, lead only to inefficiency and misunderstanding. It would leave the Board with-
out effective influence or authority. As was pointed out by the representative of Portugal, 
the operation of the Agency undoubtedly would require decisions which cannot wait a 
year between meetings of the General Conference.'' IAEA/CS/OR.18, pp. 36-37. 
31 Compare chapter V, sec. B, of the proposal for the Establishment of a General In-
ternational Organization [Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, October 7, 1944, 11 DEPT. OF 
STATE BuL. 368 (1944)] with arts. 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter of the United Nations. For 
the history of this development see BENTWICH AND MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON TiiE CHAR-
TER OF nm UNITED NATIONS 35 (1950), and Gilchrist, "The United Nations Charter with 
Explanatory Notes of Its Development at San Francisco .•• ," in 413 INTERNATIONAL CoN-
Cll.IATION 452-454 (1945). 
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The most difficult and controversial question which arose in 
the negotiations prior to the International Conference was the 
composition and manner of selection of the Board of Governors.32 
A number of formulae for the composition of the Board were 
considered and rejected. At one time, a system of weighted voting 
based on contributions was suggested but was discarded largely 
because of the technical difficulties of evaluating the contribu-
tions in different types of materials. The advisability of granting 
permanent seats to the most advanced atomic powers was also 
studied and rejected because of the impossibility of developing 
long-term criteria for permanent membership.33 As the number 
of negotiating powers increased, the proposed number of the 
Board members increased. The additional seats would be filled 
mainly by "atomic have-nots" thus diluting the influence of the 
"atomic powers" in the Board. The debate in the United Nations 
General Assembly created pressures in this direction.34 
The twelve-power draft and the final text provide for a Board 
of 23 of which IO will be elected by the General Conference.35 The 
remaining 13 will be chosen by the outgoing board on the basis 
of (a) their potential for contributions in materials and skills, 
and (b) a pattern of geographic representation for the major 
regions of the world. The top five "atomic powers"36 may claim 
what amounts in fact to a permanent membership as long as they 
retain their leading position in the atomic energy field-regard-
less of whether they actually contribute to the Agency and re-
gardless of any geographic criteria.37 
32 Concerning the Board, the original outline of the statute transmitted to the Soviet 
Union on March 19, 1954 (see Appendix A) provided in art. II, par. C, subpar. I, for a 
"limited membership" representing governments in which it "might be desirable to take 
account of geographic distribution and membership by prospective beneficiaries," and 
that "the principal contributors would be on the Board of Governors." 
as See Report by Ambassador Morehead Patterson, 34 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 5 at 6 
(1956). Art. II, par. C, subpar. 2 of the first American outline [ATOMS FOR PEACE MANUAL, 
note 5 supra, at 267] stated that "arrangements could be worked out to give the principal 
contributing countries special voting privileges on certain matters, such as allocations of 
fissionable material." 
84 See note 24 supra. 
35 Art. VI, par. A, subpar. 3 of the 12-power draft and identical article in the statute. 
The membership of the Board will be twenty-three, on the assumption that "the five mem-
bers most advanced in the technology of atomic energy" continue to be the United States, 
United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Canada, France, or continue to represent three geographic areas. 
If the five represented more or fewer than three areas, it would change the size of the 
Board. The 8-power draft in art. VII, par. A provided for a Board of 16. Five of the 
members would be the most important contributors of technical assistance and fissionable 
material, five others selected from the principal producers and contributors of source mate-
rials, and only six were to be elected by the General Conference. 
36 At present the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and 
Canada. 
37 See Appendix D below. 
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Despite widespread criticism in the International Conference 
of the composition of 'the Board and despite a number of amend-
ments suggested particularly by the Afro-Asian powers to increase 
their representation on the Board, the provisions of the twelve-
power draft were adopted without change by the conference.38 
All the negotiating powers including the Soviet representative 
urged strongly that no change be made in the formula on the 
ground that no better formula could be contrived in view of the 
political realities.39 
However, two concessions were made to the critics of this 
formula. First, it was provided that the question of a general 
review of the provisions of the statute should be placed on the 
agenda of the fifth annual session of the General Conference.40 In 
the debate, it was made clear that the composition of the Board 
would be included in such review. In particular, the special 
representation of the producers of source materials would 00-
reconsidered since many additional states during the next five-
38 Seven amendments to arL VI were proposed, five of them dealing with the composi-
tion and selection of the members of the Board. These five amendments were sponsored 
respectively by: Denmark and Iran, IAEA/CS/Art. VI/Amend. 2; Philippines, IAEA/CS/Art. 
VI/Amend. 4; Liberia, IAEA/CS/Art. VI/Amend. 5; Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Syria, 
IAEA/CS/Art. VI/Amend. 6; and Italy, IAEA/CS/Art. VI/Amend. 7. None of these amend-
ments was adopted. Amendments 2 and 7 were withdrawn. Amendment 4, though not 
formally withdrawn, was not pressed to a vote. Amendment 5 was rejected by 31 to 15 
votes, 20 abstaining. Amendment 6 was rejected by 26 to 26 votes with 18 abstaining. 
(Amendments 5 and 6 attempted to increase the participation of Africa and the Middle 
East.) Art. VI as a whole was adopted by 71 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions. 
39The Soviet representative, Mr. Zarubin, said: "The draft article before the Com-
mittee seems to be the reasonable compromise .••• [I]n a spirit of co-operation the dele-
gation of the Soviet Union has decided not to move any amendments to draft article VI .••• 
[T]he delegation of the Soviet Union hopes that the same spirit of co-operation will pre-
vail among other delegations, and it appeals to all to accept article VI of the draft statute 
at it stands." IAEA/CS/OR.20, p. 3. 
Mr. Wadsworth, U.S. representative, agreed. "As the representative of the Soviet Union 
has just said, since the outset of the negotiations on the statute over two years ago, the 
question of the Board has presented arduous and complicated problems. It was only with 
considerable difficulty that agreement was reached among the original eight Negotiating 
States on the formula which was contained in the draft statute of 22 August 1955 .••• 
[S]ince this formula represents a finely balanced compromise, even one small part cannot 
be changed without affecting the whole." IAEA/CS/OR.20, pp. 4-6. 
Mr. Bhabha, representative from India, remarked: " ••• [W]e recognize that the com-
position as set up in the present draft has been arrived at by give and take on all sides, 
and we cannot, therefore, expect to have those particular articles changed that we do not 
agree with without, naturally, others also asking for a change in articles with which they 
do not agree. We are, therefore, prepared to accept this article as it now stands and to 
support it." IAEA/CS/OR.20, p. 12. 
40 Statute, arL XVIII, par. B. Interesting to recall is the analogy to the United Na-
tions Charter: The critics of the Great Power veto at the San Francisco conference were 
placated in part by the inclusion in the Charter of a provision for a review and revision 
of this instrument {arL 109 of the Charter). See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS, CoMMENTARY AND DocuMENIS, 2d ed., 539-540 (1949). 
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year period were likely to become large scale producers of either 
uranium or thorium. 
The second concession was the selection of all six elected rep-
resentatives on the Preparatory Commission from the Afro-Asian 
and Latin American group. 41 · 
Functions of the Agency 
A. Peaceful vs. Military Purposes. All Agency functions 
relate solely to the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful pur-
poses. The Agency is directed to ensure, "so far as it is able," that 
its assistance is not used in such a way as to further any "military 
purpose. "42 
During the International Conference, France introduced an 
amendment defining "military purpose" as follows: "The only 
uses of atomic energy which shall be regarded as uses for non-
peaceful purposes are military applications of the atomic ex-
plosion and of the toxicity of radioactive products."43 This amend-
ment seems to be based on the conclusion that the greatest 
menace to the world from the military use of the atom arises as 
a result of nuclear explosions and from the toxicity of radioactive 
materials. The concept of "military purpose" thus would be 
limited to these uses only and would not include for instance the 
use of nuclear fuel in the propulsion of a submarine, an aeroplane 
or a missile; the menace from these latter uses is not much greater 
than that arising from the use of conventional fuels for similar 
objectives. Under the French amendment the use of power 
derived from atomic fuel in a munitions plant, for instance, would 
not constitute a military use. 
In urging the adoption of a restrictive definition of "military 
purposes" the Indian representative suggested that any state 
having a military program should be ineligible for any Agency 
assistance since, for instance, material made available to such 
state, under Agency safeguards, for its non-military program would 
release corresponding materials for its military program.44 
During the conference, it became apparent that any attempt 
to define "military purpose" in the statute would raise more 
problems than it would solve. France never brought its amend-
41 See Appendix E. 
42 Statute, art. II, second sentence. 
43 IAEA/CS/Art.XX/Amend. I. 
44 IAEA/CS/OR.28, pp. 66-67. 
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ment to a vote. 45 It would not have been desirable for the Agency 
to adopt a definition that by implication would sanction, for 
example, the use of Agency assistance for an atomic submarine. 
The present text sets up a broad standard under which the Board 
of Governors will have to develop criteria applicable to specific 
situations as they may arise. 
B. Atomic Power. From the beginning of the negotiations, 
recognition has been given to the principle that the Agency shall 
have a broad responsibility for all phases of development of the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, the portion of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's addres.s to the General Assembly of December 
8, 1953 that had the greatest effect on public opinion throughout 
the world was his statement that " ... peaceful power from atomic 
energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already·proved, 
is here-now-today."46 Thus, the function of the Agency which 
has received the greatest public attention is to furnish atomic fuel 
for the production of electric power. The functions of the Agency, 
however, extend to many other matters such as research, training, 
exchange of information and development of standards of health 
and safety.47 
C. Training and Research. The final text reflects the im-
portance of the function of training-a recognition that the ab-
sence of trained technicians and engineers may be the greatest 
obstacle to early development of worldwide electric power derived 
from atomic fuels.48 The Agency may wish to place great emphasis 
in its early years on the subject of training.49 
45 France withdrew its amendment with the understanding that its substance should 
be considered by the Preparatory Commission. IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 33. There also was a 
proposed revision of the French amendment submitted by India. See Conference Room 
Paper No. 17. This revision read: "Any military purpose shall mean the production, test• 
ing or use of nuclear, thermonuclear and radiological weapons." This revision also was 
withdrawn, the Indian delegate commenting: "We agree that this matter should be noted 
in the future and we do not wish at this stage to press this particular amendment to a 
vote." IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 34. 
46 ATOMS FOR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, at 5. 
47 See Statute, art. III.. 
48 Note, e.g., the inclusion of the words "and training" in art. III, par. A, subpar. 4 
of the statute, which originated in a Polish amendment. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 2/Rev. 
I. This addition was adopted by 78 votes. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. II. 
49 A number of amendments were proposed during the conference which would pro• 
vide for specific activities of the Agency, such as the amendments submitted by Bolivia 
and Ecuador to establish a world university of the atom (IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 9), 
the Haitian amendment to provide for granting scholarships by the Agency (IAEA/CS/Art. 
III/Amend. I), and the Polish amendment to publish an international periodical devoted 
to the peaceful uses of atomic energy (IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 2/Rev. 1). These amend-
ments were all defeated on the ground that the functions of the Agency should be general 
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It should be noted that the Agency is authorized to encourage 
and assist research and "to perform any operation or service 
useful in research."50 While there is no express prnvision au-
thorizing Agency research,51 it is doubtful whether the Agency 
could successfully carry out its safeguard, and health and safety 
functions or attract qualified personnel without some research 
program. 
D. Health and Safety Standards. The Agency has broad 
functions in the field of health and safety. It is authorized "to 
establish or adopt. . . standards of safety for protection of health 
and minimization of danger to life and property (including such 
standards for labour conditions) .... " It may "provide for the 
application of these standards to its own operations as well as to the 
operations making use of materials, services, equipment, facilities, 
and information made available by the Agency or at its request 
or under its control or supervision .... "52 As in the case of safe-
guards against diversion of materials, it may also "provide for 
the application of these standards, at the request of the parties, 
to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or 
at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the 
field of atomic energy .... "53 States receiving Agency assistance 
must agree to meet Agency health and safety standards.54 
The authority of the Agency to prescribe such standards is 
not confined to the type of hazards peculiar to operations utilizing 
nuclear materials. Likewise there is nothing to prevent the 
Agency from applying to operations coming under its juris-
diction far more stringent standards than the country where the 
operation takes place applies to its operations. In such an event, 
as a practical matter, the Agency would probably have to rely for 
enforcement of these higher standards on its own inspectors. It 
could not readily utilize the local authorities even in policing 
non-radiological hazards if those authorities applied different and 
less stringent standards. 
and the decision on specific activities should be left to the Board of Governors. (E.g., the 
argument of Mr. Wadsworth, representative of the United States in IAEA/CS/OR.16, p. 17). 
50 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. I. 
51 The first United States outline (see Appendix A) mentioned "data developed as a 
result of its own activities" (art. III, par. C, subpar. 2), which would imply independent re• 
search by the Agency. In the later drafts no such clause can be found. However, there is 
nothing in the statute to prohibit research by the Agency as long as it is for peaceful uses 
and furthers the purposes of the statute. 
52 Statute, art. Ill, par. A, subpar. 6. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 4 (b); and art. XII, par. A, subpars. l and 2. 
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It would seem advisable for the Agency in setting up the 
standards in this field to cooperate as fully as possible with the 
state where the facility is located; in general, the Agency should 
insist on more rigorous standards than those prescribed by local 
laws only in the interest of preventing hazards affecting more 
than one state (for example, reactor incidents which would con-
taminate a considerable area or waste disposal affecting inter-
national waterways).55 
Health and safety standards and practically every function 
of the Agency, excepting the procurement and disposal of mate-
rials and the operation of the safeguard system against diversion, 
is of some concern to various specialized agencies of the United 
Nations. This makes it essential that there should be a clear-cut 
division of functions. 
The Secretary General of the United Nations in a study of 
the question of the relation of the International Agency to the 
United Nations56 recognizes this situation and suggests as one of 
the principles of that relationship "recognition by the United 
Nations of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the agency. 
under the aegis of the United Nations ... , responsible for taking ac-
tion under its Statute for the accomplishment of the objectives set 
forth therein."56a If this principle is carried out, the present and 
prospective programs of some of the specialized agencies in the 
atomic energy field may be considerably curtailed.57 
E. Exchange of Information. The Agency is to disseminate 
the information obtained from the members and encourage the 
exchange of information among them. The statute differentiates 
between information arising from assistance extended by the 
Agency and other information. With respect to the former "Each 
member shall make available to the Agency" all such information.58 
The obligation in connection with information from other sources 
is much less sweeping: each member "should make available such 
information as would in the judgment of the member be helpful 
to the Agency."59 This latter loose undertaking and the obligation 
55 For a discussion of analogous problems arising from federal v. state regulations in 
this field, see STASON, ESTEP AND PIERCE, STATE REGULATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY, published 
under the auspices of the University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor (1956). 
56 General Assembly Document A/3122 of April 20, 1956, reproduced in IAEA/CS/5, 
September 24, 1956. 
56a Id. at par. 4. 
57 See Appendix F. 
58 Statute, art. VIII, par. B (emphasis added). 
59 Statute, art. VIII, par. A (emphasis added). 
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to share in the administrative budget seem to be the duties which 
a member assumes through signing and ratifying the statute. 
Other obligations arise only in connection with specific agree-
ments between the member and the Agency concerning the receipt 
of benefits, contributions to the Agency or the application of 
safeguards on request. 
Under article III, paragraph A, subparagraph 5 of the statute, 
it would be possible to extend the Agency safeguards system into 
the field of information. Theoretically, therefore, the United 
States and other governments could turn over classified data to 
the Agency.59a As a practical matter, this is unlikely to happen 
since data available to the Agency will generally become available 
to all of its members. 
The Director General and the staff of the Agency are required 
not to "disclose any industrial secret or other confidential infor-
mation coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties 
for the Agency." This provision was included by the Conference 
on the initiative of Switzerland.60 
Agency Facilities 
The Agency is authorized "to acquire or establish any facilities, 
plant and equipment useful in carrying out its authorized func-
tions, whenever the facilities, plant and equipment otherwise 
available to it in the area concerned are inadequate or available 
only on terms it deems unsatisfactory."61 This emphasizes a more 
gradual acquisition of facilities than another provision that "the 
Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire" storage 
facilities and certain types of other facilities.62 These provisions 
are the end product of discussions which commenced on the day 
of President Eisenhower's address as to whether the Agency should 
be "a bank" -should have actual possession of fissionable mate-
rials-or a "clearing house" merely arranging as an intermediary 
for the international distribution of fissionable materials from 
one country to the other. The statute clearly authorizes the Agency 
to be a "bank" and contemplates such a result. The Agency may, 
however, operate also as a "clearing house." 
li9aFor the provisions of U.S. law, see 42 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill, 1956) §§2164, 2153, 2154 
(Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 703, note 8 supra, §§144, 123, 124). 
60Statute, art. VII, par. F. IAEA/CS/Art. VII/Amend. 5/Rev. 1, adopted in revised 
form (Conference Room Paper No. 4) by 76 votes to none. IAEA/CS/OR.26, p. 12. 
61 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. 7. 
62 Statute, art. IX, par. I. 
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Agency Safeguards 
There were three possible ways of dealing with the problems 
of safeguards against diversion of fissionable materials to military 
uses. First, international transfer of fissionable materials for peace-
ful uses might have taken place without any safeguards. The result 
of this course would have been that in a short time many states 
would have been in a position to develop atomic weapons. 63 It 
certainly would not be in the interest of world peace if a large 
number of states were in a position to use or threaten to use 
atomic weapons. There is less danger when three states have 
atomic weapons than when more than eighty states have them. In 
this respect, it is possible that the interests of the United States 
and of the Soviet Union might coincide. 
A second possible course would have been to delay the develop-
ment of the peaceful uses of atomic energy because of the danger to 
world peace through diversion to military purposes. In view of 
the rapid worldwide increase in power requirements and imminent 
shortages of conventional fuels any such course would, have in-
evitably handicapped efforts to improve world standards of living. 
The statute follows a third and middle course which permits 
the development of peaceful uses with safeguards designed to 
deter the development of new weapons programs. The success 
of the system of safeguards will depend on a wide variety of 
factors including technological and political developments. 
The statute establishes the basic principle that safeguards will 
be imposed only in connection with agreements between the 
Agency and states which are beneficiaries of Agency projects.64 
63 The possible increase of the production of atomic weapons resulting from peaceful 
uses was used by the Soviet Union as an argument against international cooperation in the 
field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. See, e.g., the Aide Memoire of September 22, 1954 in 
the ATOMS FoR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, 278 at 281. 
64 Art. XI, par. F of the statute reads (in part): "Upon approving a project, the Agency 
shall enter into an agreement with the member or group of members submitting the proj-
ect, which agreement shall: ••• 4. Include undertakings by the member or group of mem• 
hers submitting the project (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way 
as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be subject to the safe-
guards provided for in art. XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agree-
ment. ••. " The Agency could not waive the inclusion of the safeguard provision in the 
project agreement. See art. XI, par. F, subpar. 4, and art. III, par. D referring to "agree-
ments ••. which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the statute." (Emphasis 
added.) What would be the situation if the safeguards specified in the agreement are for 
some reason less stringent than the "relevant" safeguards specified in article XII? Could 
the Agency under article XII nevertheless enforce the "statutory" safeguards? There may 
be some support for an affirmative answer in the language of the statute and particularly 
in the fairly detailed enumeration of the safeguards therein. However, such detailed 
enumeration may well have been due solely to the desire to avoid complaints on the part 
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States do not submit to the system of safeguards merely by ratify-
ing the statute. A further step is essential. 
The Soviet Union during the negotiations has on the surface 
at least made a complete about-face in its attitude toward safe-
guards. Pointing to the fact that weapons grade plutonium is a 
necessary by-product of the operation of every power reactor the 
Soviet Union initially opposed all safeguards (and for that matter 
any agency dealing with quantities of fissionable materials) in the 
absence of a prohibition of atomic weapons. Gradually the Soviet 
Uniori altered its position until it accepted the present provisions 
of the statute with some vague warnings about infringement of 
sovereignty through operation of the inspection system.65 
It is possible that the changed attitude was influenced by the 
discussions on the subject of safeguards which took place in 
Geneva in August 1955 immediately following the United Nations 
Scientific Conference. The exchange of notes between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on this subject indicates the prob-
ability of further bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on 
the problem of safeguards.66 
The statute elaborates in considerable detail the Agency safe-
guards66a which include the right of the Agency 
1. To approve the design of specialized equipment and 
facilities, including nuclear reactors; 
2. To require the observance of Agency prescribed health 
and safety measures; 
of beneficiary states that the proposed project agreements worked out by the Board bore 
no relation to the obligations which they thought they assumed when they signed the 
statute. It was agreed among the eight negotiating states that some provisions specifying 
the nature of the safeguards should be included in the statute. These provisions were vastly 
expanded and improved in subsequent drafts. 
65 See Appendix G. 
66 The Soviet Union in its Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1956 (in United States Department 
of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 28) stated that "the consideration of this 
problem [of the extension of the Agency safeguards to bilateral agreements] could be re-
sumed after the statute is adopted by the Conference and after it is ratified by the countries 
involved." In its answer of August 15, 1956 (id. at 29, 30), the United States pointed to the 
fact that it will take some time until the Agency safeguards will be operative and that the 
United States Government is therefore interested in standardizing the already existing 
safeguards. Mentioning the statement of the Soviet Union that it had already initiated a 
program for rendering assistance to a number of states and that the same was true with 
respect to the United Kingdom and Canada (France having similar plans), the Department 
o_f State, in the interest of assuring the effectiveness of the Agency proposed an early com-
mencement of staff level talks to explore the possibility of reaching uniform safeguards 
for bilateral agreements not less comprehensive than the present ones of the Agency. The 
United States aide-memoire also mentioned that Canada, France and the United Kingdom 
indicated their interest in participating in such talks. 
66a Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpars. 1-6. 
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3. To require the maintenance and production of operating 
- records; 
4. To call for and receive progress reports; 
5. To exercise stringent controls over the operations con-
nected with production of power where diversion of :fissionable 
materials to weapons can most readily take place; 
6. To establish a system of inspection through a staff of 
international inspectors. 67 
The statute deals in some detail with remedies in the event 
of non-compliance with the safeguard requirements.68 Inspectors 
shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall 
·transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall 
call upon the recipient state to remedy forthwith any non-com-
pliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report 
the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council 
and General Assembly of the United Nations. If the non-com-
pliance constitutes a potential or actual threat to international 
peace, the Security Council could exercise its considerable powers 
under the United Nations Charter assuming, of course, that the 
five permanent members agree. The General Assembly might also 
exercise its recommendatory authority on the basis of the report of 
the Board. 69 
In the event of non-compliance, the Board may direct cur-
tailment or suspension of assistance provided by the Agency and 
call for return of materials and equipment made available to the 
recipient member. Obviously, the "recapture" of misused material 
would depend ultimately on the cooperation of the recipient 
state. The Agency may also suspend the non-complying member 
from exercise of the rights and privileges of membership.70 
67For the functions of the inspectors see art. XII, par. A, subpar. 6, par. B and par. C 
of the statute. The inspectors supervise the compliance with health and safety standards 
and safeguards against diversion both in the Agency facilities and in the facilities of its 
members under project and other agreements. 
68 Statute, art. XII, par. C, and par. A, subpar. 7. The purpose of art. XII, par. A, 
subpar. 7 is not at all clear in view of the almost identical provision in art. XII, par. C. 
69 For full discussion of the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly 
in this respect see GOODRICH AND SIMONS, THE U.N. AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1955). 
70 Statute, art. XII, par. C, and art. XIX, par. B. Since the suspension can only take 
place in accordance with art. XIX, it seems that all the requirements of par. B of art. XIX 
must be present, namely, persistent violation of the statute or agreements, unless art. XII, 
par. C can be read as providing for an independent basis for suspension in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in art. XIX. 
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It would seem that the finding of non-compliance by the 
Board may serve as a basis for immediate withdrawal of any Agency 
assistance and for other remedial measures. The state affected 
will no doubt be given full opportunity to present its defense. 
However, it would appear that under the statute such a state does 
not have the right to avoid or delay the remedial measures by 
invoking the procedure for settlement of disputes discussed 
below.71 
The provisions for sending inspectors designated by the Agency 
"after consultation" with the state involved into territories of 
recipient states permit access of these inspectors "at all times to 
all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupa-. 
tion deals with materials, equipment, or facilities. . . to be safe-
guarded, as necessary to account" for the materials, to check on 
compliance with health and safety measures and other conditions 
of the Agency projects agreements.72 These are truly unprece-
dented inspection powers which apply regardless of the type or 
extent of Agency assistance. Yet, these provisions resulted in 
relatively little controversy during the International Conference.78 
They may, however, cause considerable difficulty when the time 
comes to apply them. Substantially the same powers of access, 
however, are given to the United States audit inspectors under the 
bilateral agreements concluded by the United States.74 Some coun-
tries which are parties to these agreements might prefer to have 
the inspection performed by an international agency rather than 
by nationals of the United States.75 
71 Pp. 776 and 777. 
72 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpar. 6. 
7& Switzerland proposed 2 changes in subpar. 6 of art. XII, par. A of tbe statute. The 
fixst of tbem was to clarify tbat tbe persons subject to control by Agency inspectoxs are only 
tbose who because of tbeir occupations deal witb materials, equipment and facilities sup-
plied by tbe Agency. The second envisaged tbat tbe inspectors be accompanied by repre-
sentatives of tbe state concerned, if tbe state requested it and tbe inspectors are not im-
peded thereby. See IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. I/Corr. I and Corr. I/Rev. I. See also 
Conference Room Papers Nos. 6 and 13 and tbe Swiss statement in IAEA/CS/OR.37, p. 102, 
for changes from tbe original wording of tbe amendments. Botb amendments were ac-
cepted by 77 votes to none witb no absentions. FQr ratber unenlightening statements on tbe 
scope of inspection, see IAEA/CS/OR.29, pp. 17, 62, 87. 
74 See, e.g., art. X of tbe agreement for cooperation between tbe United States and 
France, 102 CONG. REc. 10398 aune 29, 1956). 
75 One of tbe problems tbat might confront tbe Agency in working out its system 
of inspection, namely tbe composition of inspection teams, was brought to tbe attention 
of tbe Conference in tbe proposed Philippines addition to article XII (IAEA/CS/Art. 
XII/ Amend. 4) reading as follows: "Any mission of inspection to determine any diversion 
to military end contrary to tbis statute shall consist of at least tbree members: one from tbe 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and two others from tbe five members most advanced 
in tbe technology of atomic energy referred to in sub-paragraph A-I of Article VI of tbis 
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The principal opposition to the safeguards prov1S1ons in the 
twelve-power draft came from India. Practically the entire debate 
on safeguards in the conference centered on the three reservations 
entered by India.76 The main thrust of the Indian objection was 
directed against the inclusion of source materials77 in the account-
ability system and against the almost unrestricted right of the 
Agency to dispose of the by-product weapon grade material pro-
duced in operation of the power reactors. This latter right was 
considered essential to the safeguards system for a number of 
reasons, one of which was to prevent states from stockpiling 
greater quantities of weapons grade by-product than they could 
presently use for peaceful purposes.78 India contended that the 
statute would give the Agency perpetual and far-reaching power 
to affect the economic life of states. The ingenious compromise 
solution reached in the conference retains the accountability of 
source materials but restricts the right of the Agency with respect 
to the "special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-
product"; the states will have the right to retain (under con-
tinuing Agency safeguards) such quantities of the by-product 
materials as they can use "for research or in reactors, existing or 
under construction."79 
statute." (UK, US, USSR, Canada, France). This amendment received no substantial sup-
port. For an explanation of the motivation of this amendment see the statement of the 
Philippine representative in IAEA/CS/OR.27, p. 36. 
Mr. Virgin, Swedish representative remarked: "The recruitment of the staff of in• 
spectors and the selection of members of a mission will obviously give rise to many prob-
lems .••• My delegation feels that on those questions one should not go into further 
detail in the statute itself than has been done, but that it should be left to the Agency 
to find an appropriate course of action and to arrange in each particular case for the 
inspection under the general rules of the statute and, of course, of any agreement between 
the Agency and the recipient member oountry. The consultation envisaged in paragraph 
A 6 to which I just referred will give ample opportunity to the recipient country to give 
its views for the consideration and guidance of the Agency. . . . It would mean intro-
ducing an entirely new principle if staff members from particular countries or group of 
countries were to be given the right of being represented in a given function of an inter-
national organization." IAEA/CS/OR.27, pp. 67-68. For further statements in opposition 
to the Philippine amendment see IAEA/CS/OR.24, p. 67 (Australia); IAEA/CS/OR.30, 
p. 26 (U.S.S.R.). The Philippine delegation did not press the amendment to a vote. 
IAEA/CS/OR.30, p. 47. 
76 See Appendix H. 
77 See note 10 supra for the definition of this term. 
78 For the United States view see the statement by Mr. Wadsworth, United States rep· 
resentative, in IAEA/CS/OR.29, pp. 59-61. 
79 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpar. 5. See Conference Papers Nos. 19 and 21, contain-
ing the amendments adopted in the statute. As a practical matter under existing technology 
very little plutonium or U-233 would come under this exception at the present time, and 
the states will thus be required to dispose of the bulk of these materials as instructed by 
the Agency. fu addition, states would have the right to require that special fissionable 
materials produced as a result of such operations and deposited with the Agency, "be re-
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The discussion on the safeguards occupied about half of the 
Conference debates. The compromise solution removed the last 
obstacle to the unanimous approval of the statute. 
While the provisions of the statute concerning safeguards are 
fairly detailed, the agreements be~ween the Agency and its mem-
bers will very likely have to go into considerably greater detail. 
The only restriction on the terms of the agreements is that all 
their provisions "shall be in accordance with the provisions of the 
statute .... "80 
The elaboration and establishment of a detailed system of 
safeguards will pose a great challenge to the Board of Governors; 
outstanding scientific skill coupled with wise political counsel 
will "be required to meet this challenge.81 If the Agency grows 
into an active body, its standards of safeguards for security as 
well as of health and safety will have direct influence on national 
standards developed by member states. The Agency may con-
tribute to worldwide uniformity of these vital standards. Unprec-
edented questions will arise in coordinating the inspection and 
enforcement functions between the Agency and the member states 
or groups of states such as EURATOM .. 
Supplying of Materials 
The statute makes a differentiation between fissionable mate-
rials and other materials which may be useful to the Agency.82 
turned promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions 
as stated above." Thus economic and political factors could not deprive states of the 
plutonium and other fissionable by-products produced from their reactors. At the same 
time, states would not be permitted to accumulate idle stockpiles of plutonium readily 
usable for atomic weapons. 
80 Statute, art. III, par. D. 
81 As the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Ahmad, put it, "It will be up to the Board 
of Governors, as it considers different specific situations ahd as it attempts to implement 
agreements which the statute provides for, to consider most carefully where there is a 
necessity for applying rigidly the rules contained in the statute in this specific case, and I 
take it that it will, in a realistic way, seek for each project technical solutions which, while 
upholding the main ideas of control, will burden the recipient country with the minimum 
of difficulties." IAEA/CS/OR.28, pp. 24-25. 
82 The definitions of the various types of materials as defined in art. XX (notes 8 to 10 
supra) bear resemblance to those of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 
(Supp. Ill, 1956) §2014(s) and §2014(t). The definitions in the statute are, however, more 
specific than .those of the Act. Definitions similar to those of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 are contained in the bilateral agreements between the United States and other coun-
tries. See, e.g., art. I, pars. H and I, of the Agreement for Co-operation Between the United 
States and France, 102 CoNG. REc. 10398 (June 29, 1956). The Indian amendment 
(IAEA/CS/Art. XX/Amend. 2), which had proposed that irradiated source material should 
be excluded from the definition of special fissionable material (art. XX, par. 1), was not 
adopted by the International Conference. 
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Theoretically, the Agency is to accept any amounts of special 
fissionable materials offered to it subject only to reaching agree-
ment on a proper price and matters incidental to the transfer.83 
This would carry out the underlying concept advanced by Presi-
dent Eisenhower in the General Assembly in 1953 that the Agency 
should syphon off the supplies of fissionable materials from 
military to peacetime uses.84 
In contrast, the Agency would accept only such quantities of 
source materials and other materials as determined by the Board 
of Governors.85 Without such a provision, the Agency might be 
overwhelmed with materials useful in connection with atomic 
energy programs but in surplus supply. 
The statute does not specify whether the contributed material 
will be sold or leased to the Agency; nor does it fix the legal form 
of the transaction through which the material will be made 
available by the Agency to the recipient state.86 This commendable 
omission will allow the Board to work out agreements tailored 
to different types of projects and fitting the requirements of 
national legislation.87 As long as the safeguards obligations are 
effectively imposed, the question of the legal form of the trans-
action is relatively unimportant.88 
One of the most difficult problems in connection with the 
supplying of materials will be the determination of the amount 
the Agency will pay for the contributed materials. This is inter-
twined with the problems of financing of the Agency and will 
be dealt with later in that connection. 
No member may require that the materials it makes available 
to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency or designate the 
specific project in which they must be used.80 It seems to be the 
83 Statute, art. IX, par. A. This provision does not have the restriction contained in 
par. B for source materials, namely, the power of the Board of Governors to "determine 
the quantities of such materials which the Agency will accept. • • ." 
84 See p. 748 supra. For the proposition that such was the purpose of the language in 
par. A of art. IX, see Mr. du Plessis (representative of the Union of South Africa), who 
said: "Article IX • • • does not give the Agency the right to refuse these materials since 
such a right would be incompatible with the disarmament purposes of the Agency." 
IAEA/CS/OR.20, p. 28. 
85 Statute, Art. IX, par. B. 
sa The statute uses the inconclusive term "reimbursement" in art. XIII to describe 
the payment made to contributing members. The terms "withdraw" used in art. XII, par. 
A, subpar. 7, and "return" in art. XII, par. C of the statute are also inconclusive. 
87 For problems arising under the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in regard 
to the title to fissionable material and the forms of transaction used, see pp. 782-783 infra. 
ss See Appendix I. 
89 See art. IX, par. J of the statute. This provision refers both to material stored with 
the Agency and those stored by the member in accordance with art. IX, par. A, second sen-
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purpose of this provision to ensure that all contributed materials 
are available for all approved projects. 
Once a member has notified the Agency of its intention to 
make a contribution, the member must be in a position to make 
delivery immediately to the recipient state as instructed by the 
Agency or to the Agency itself to the extent that such materials 
are "really necessary for operations and scientific research in 
the facilities of the Agency."90 However, the member in its 
discretion may decide whether it will retain possession of the 
material pending instructions to deliver or make an agreement with 
the Agency for storage in the Agency's depots.00a The latter 
alternative will be feasible, of course, only when the Agency has 
established its storage facilities. 
One great problem that will confront the Agency is the lo-
cation of storage facilities when they are established. The head-
quarters of the Agency in Vienna would not be a particularly suit-
able location for storage facilities.91 In storing special fissionable 
materials in its possession, the Agency is under obligation to insure 
the geographical distribution of these materials in such a way 
as not to allow concentration of large amounts of such materials 
in any one country or region of the world. 92 It will be difficult 
to find locations where the fissionable materials could be disposed 
of on short notice in the event of an attempt to seize them. A 
possible location would be on an island where in an emergency 
they could be dumped into the sea. 
According to the statute, unless the Board decides otherwise, 
the materials initially made available shall be for the period of 
one year.98 
tence, for in either case the materials are "made available." While a member has not the 
right to demand that its contribution be used for a specific project, the article does not 
seem to preclude the Agency from agreeing to such a use. To what extent would such 
agreement bind the Agency? Does the express exclusion of the right to demand the use 
of a contribution in a specific project exclude any and all conditions, e.g., the condition 
that the contribution be not used in a specified area or for a certain type of project? 
90 Statute, art. IX, par. D. This means that a state is obligated to deliver materials to 
the Agency c;inly for the Agency's own immediate needs. Therefore, the Agency acts as a 
"bank" only for the materials stored at the request of the supplying member. All other 
material is transferred directly from the contributing to the recipient country. The word 
"really," which is bad English, was designed to emphasize the immediate character of the 
Agency's own requirements for operations and research. It was introduced in the twelve-
power draft on Soviet insistence. 
90a Statute, art. IX, par. A, second sentence. 
91 Vienna was tentatively selected by the Conference as the permanent site of the 
Agency's headquarters on October 23, 1956. IAEA/CS/OR.39, p. 62. 
92 Statute, art. IX, par. H, third sentence. 
98 Statute, art. IX, par. F, second sentence. The statute does not say specifically 
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A provision of this nature was probably necessary since the 
chief contributors would not wish to bind themselves for any 
longer period until they could determine how well the Agency was 
functioning. However, it is somewhat unrealistic. The Agency 
projects will require a continuous supply of fissionable materials. 
It will be necessary for the Agency, before it approves a project, 
to have some assurance of a continuing supply of fissionable 
materials for the life of the project. The bilateral agreements of 
the United States generally provide for the supply of materials 
for at least five years.94 In comparison, an Agency project would 
not be particularly attractive if it could guarantee materials 
only for one year. The United States has already indicated its 
intention to make materials available to the Agency for a longer 
period. On the final day of the conference, Chairman Lewis 
Strauss of the United States Atomic Energy Commission delivered 
a message of the President of the United States: 
"To enable the International Atomic Energy Agency, upon 
its establishment by appropriate governmental actions, to 
start atomic research and power programs without delay, the 
United States will make available to the Agency, on terms 
to be agreed with that body, 5,000 kilograms of a nuclear 
fuel uranium 235 from the 20,000 kilograms of such material 
allocated last February by the United States for peaceful 
uses by friendly nations. . . . In addition to the above 
mentioned initial 5,000 kilograms of uranium 235, the United 
States will continue to make available to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency nuclear materials that will match in 
amount the sum of all quantities of such materials made 
similarly available by all members of the International Agency, 
and on comparable terms, for the period between the establish-
ment of the A.gency and July I, 1960. The United States will 
deliver these nuclear materials to the International Agency 
as they are required for Agency approved projects."911 
whether the period covered by the contribution must be determined in the agreement with 
the contributor and whether the Board has discretion to modify such period. 
94E.g., in art. XI of the Agreement for Co-operation between the United States and 
Cuba, 102 CoNG. REc. 10396 Gune 29, 1956), and between the United States and the 
Dominican Republic (also art. XI), id., 10401 at 10402. 
The Atomic Energy Commission on November 18, 1956 announced that it is prepared 
to furnish fuel requirements beyond the term of ten years. Statement by the Chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Press Release, November 18, 1956, p. 3. 
95IAEA/CS/OR.40, p. 7. The announcement of the Atomic Energy Commission, re-
ferred to in the preceding footnote, leaves the door open for arrangements between the 
United States and the Agency on terms similar to those of the bilateral agreements. 
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The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have indicated 
their intention to contribute fissionable materials with the United 
Kingdom setting a relatively small quantity.96 
Project Agreements 
The principal obligations of members of the Agency includ-
ing the obligation to submit to safeguards and to health and 
safety regulations will arise only when the member signs a project 
agreement with the Agency. The statute specifies the principal 
elements which must be included in such agreement.97 
A majority of members of the Agency will have at the outset 
little technological skill in the field of atomic energy. For such 
a state to secure a power reactor through the Agency, it must 
obtain fissionable materials, technical advice, reactor components 
and financing. 
The applicant state will receive its fissionable materials from 
the Agency as a result of an agreement with the Agency. On the 
other hand, technical advice and reactor components are likely 
to be obtained from sources outside of the Agency. The terms 
and conditions under which the services and components are 
obtained must be set forth in the project agreement with the 
Agency.98 The Agency has no responsibilities in connection with 
financing the project but "upon request the Agency may also 
assist any member or group of members to make arrangements 
to secure necessary financing from outside sources to carry out 
such projects. In extending this assistance, the Agency will not 
be required to provide any guarantees or to assume any financial 
responsibility for the project. "99 
96 See the statement of Mr. Nutting in the 718th meeting of the First Committee of 
the 9th General Assembly on November 16, 1954, that the United Kingdom was prepared 
to hold available 20 kilograms of fissionable material as initial contribution to the Agency. 
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 9th Session (1954), First Committee, A/C.l/SR.718, 
p. 347 at 348. The Soviet Union on July 18, 1955 stated that it is ready "to deposit into 
an international fund for atomic materials under an international agency for atomic 
energy 50 kilograms of fissionable materials, as soon as agreement has been reached on 
the creation of such an agency." Note of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
American Embassy, in United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, October 
6, 1956, p. 11. 
97 See art. XI, par. F of the statute. 
98 Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 3. It is interesting to note that no specific provision 
is made in this subparagraph with reference to supply of information, unless the term 
"services" is meant to include supplying of information. Furthermore, subpar. 3 seems to 
be limited to situations where a project is assisted by the Agency or by the Agency and a 
"member." What if assistance is given by a non-member? 
99 Statute, art. XI, par. B. This wording originated in amendment IAEA/CS/ Art. 
XI/Amend. 1, contained in revised form in Conference Room Paper No. 5, sponsored by 
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Relation to Bilateral, Multilateral and National Programs 
An important aspect of the functions of the Agency revolves 
around its relation to the bilateral agreements for developing 
peaceful uses of atomic energy (such as the bilateral agreements 
for cooperation between the United States and thirty-seven other 
states) and multilateral arrangements (such as the proposed 
EURATOM plan under negotiation by the six members of the 
European Coal and Steel Community100 and the proposed scheme 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation).101 To 
what extent will the Agency replace bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements for international cooperation in the atomic energy 
field? To what extent will the parties to these arrangements utilize 
the Agency system of safeguards against diversion for military 
uses? 
During the United Nations General Assembly discussions of 
the Agency in the fall of 1954, in response to a question by Mr. 
Vishinsky, Ambassador Lodge indicated that the United States 
did not contemplate that the Agency would have exclusive au-
thority for international transfers of fissionable materials for 
peaceful uses of atomic energy.102 During the negotiations on the 
Agency statute it became apparent that one of the prime ob-
jectives of the Agency-prevention of the diversion of fissionable 
all 20 Latin American countries, which was adopted by 57 votes to none. IAEA/CS/OR.28, 
pp. 2-5. 
l00For a description of the proposed EURATOM plan see "Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Committee on European Integration" (Brussels, 1956), reprinted in Univ. of 
Mich. Law School Summer Institute, WoRICSHOPS ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC ENERGY 
(1956) at 201-215. See also KNORR, EURATOM AND AMERICAN POLICY (Princeton) (1956). 
101 For a description of this scheme see "Report of the Special Committee for Nuclear 
Energy to the Council," with annexes and decisions adopted by the Council on July 18, 
1956, in JOINT AcnoN BY O.E.E.C. COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (1956). 
For an earlier report, see PoSSIBILlTIES OF AcnoN IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
(O.E.E.C.) (1956). On both EURATOM and O.E.E.C. plans, see KNoRR, NUCLEAR ENERGY 
IN WESTERN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES POLICY (Princeton) (1956). 
102 In the 715th meeting of the First Committee Mr. Vyshinsky said that the meaning 
of the term "clearing-house" used for the activities of the Agency was not clear to him. 
He interpreted it to mean that if projects for the use of fissionable material transferred 
through the International Agency from one state to another were made contingent upon 
approval by the International Agency, the Agency would have the right to approve or 
reject the plans established by states for the use of fissionable materials for peaceful ends. 
This would constitute a violation of international law, if the decisions of the Agency should 
be unacceptable to the states concerned. U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 9th Session 
(1954), First Committee, A/C.l/SR.715, p. 329 at 333. 
In the 717th meeting Mr. Lodge answered that in practice the Agency would have no 
control over the use of fissionable material except when such material was specifically ear-
marked for Agency projects. Thus any state would be free to transfer fissionable materials 
to another state without having to secure the consent of the Agency. A/C.l/SR.717, 
p. MI at 843. 
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materials to military uses-could be totally dereated if the United 
States, the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union in their bilateral 
agreements should make fissionable materials available to other 
countries under less onerous safeguards than those provided in 
the Agency statute.103 Obviously if safeguards are to be effective 
the systems of safeguards under bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments must in general conform to the Agency safeguard system. 
A step in this directioµ was made by the United States in 
providing in its more recent bilateral agreements for safeguards 
substantially identical to those in the statute.104 Furthermore, states 
which are parties to these agreements undertook upon the establish-
ment of the Agency to consult with a view to transferring the 
administration of the safeguards to the Agency; either party was 
given the right to terminate a bilateral agreement if such con-
sultations do not lead to an understanding.105 It remains to be 
103 A meeting of experts was held in Geneva immediately following the scientific con-
ference in August 1955 to discuss the question of uniform safeguards. See generally United 
States Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, and Appendix A below. 
104 In regard to the standardization of safeguards, see the United States Aide-Memoire 
of August 15, 1956, in United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 
1956, pp. 29-30, and the model article, id. at 31. For actual safeguards provisions in a 
"power-bilateral," see arts. XIII and XIV of the agreement between the United States and 
Australia, 102 CONG. REC. 10412 at 10414 CTune 29, 1956). 
105 Up to this date the United States has negotiated 41 bilateral agreements for co-
operation with 39 countries. For a list of these countries, see "Records of Agreements for 
Cooperation," Division of International Affairs of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated 
October, 1956. (For earlier figures see the "Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic 
Energy Commission," July 1956, p. 12). Of these, 34 are agreements for cooperation in 
the research reactor field, 7 are "power-bilaterals." A number of other agreements for 
cooperation are under negotiation. [On U.S. bilateral agreements, see FISCHER, L'ENERGIE 
ATOMIQUE ET LES ETATS-UNIS, 241-296 (1957)]. 
Before the middle of 1956 the agreements did not refer to the International Agency. 
Agreements concluded after that time took into consideration the future establishment of 
the Agency in the following manner: 
"The Government of ------ and the Government of the United States of 
America affirm their common interest in the establishment of an international atomic 
energy agency to foster the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the event such on inter-
national agency is created: 
"I. The parties will consult with each other to determine in what respects, if any, 
they desire to modify the provisions of this agreement for cooperation. In particular, the 
parties will consult with each other to determine in what respects and to what extent 
they desire to arrange for the administration by the international agency of those condi-
tions, controls, and safeguards, including those relating to health and safety standards, 
required by the international agency in connection with similar assistance rendered to a 
cooperating nation under the aegis of the international agency. 
"2. In the event the parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement follow-
ing the consultation provided in paragraph A of this article, either party may by notifica-
tion terminate this agreement. In the event this agreement is so terminated, the Govern-
ment of -------- shall return to the United States Commission all source 
and special nuclear materials received pursuant to this agreement and in its possession 
or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction." See United States Department of 
State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 33, and, for a practical example, art. XII, par. 
A, of the Agreement for Cooperation with France, 102 CONG. REc. 10400 aune 29, 1956). 
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seen whether the Soviet Union would be willing to take a similar 
step with respect to the arrangements to which it is a party.106 The 
scheme proposed by the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation for the control of its activities in the nuclear field 
calls for arrangements with the Agency "with regard to the 
exercise of the control on the territory of countries participating 
both in the Organization and in the Agency."1 osa The Agency 
statute now specifically provides that the Agency safeguard system 
(including inspection by Agency inspectors) may be extended "at 
the request of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement."107 During the International Conference, 
at the suggestion of Thailand, this provision was further broad-
ened to permit the safeguard system and the health and safety 
system to be extended "at the request of a state to any of that 
state's activities in the field of atomic energy."108 This obviously 
is a further step in the direction of making possible a uniform 
international system of safeguards. 
The remaining steps necessary to transfer the concept of 
uniform safeguards from the realm of ideas have not yet been 
taken: first, an agreement among states disposing of fissionable 
materials outside the Agency that they will require in each instance 
the acceptance of the Agency system of safeguards as a condition 
of turning over the materials; and second, the ultimate establish-
ment of a system of safeguarded disarmament which would apply 
the system of safeguards universally to the entire atomic establish-
ment of all states including those possessing atomic weapons. In 
view of the present Soviet attitudes, the outlook for the attainment 
of this last goal in the foreseeable future is unpromising. 
The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union 
supported the Thai suggestion but gave no indication that their 
own programs would be subjected to Agency safeguards. The 
10a See note 66 supra. 
106a Sec. III, par. 12, subpar. a of the decisions adopted by the Council of the European 
Organization for Economic Cooperation on 18th July, 1956, JOINT AcnoN BY O.E.E.C. 
COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF NUCI.EAR ENERGY pp. 132-133 (1956). For the type of security 
controls and safeguards contemplated, see id. at 57-73. For the controls and safeguards 
contemplated by EURATOM, see "Report of the Intergovernmental Committee," note 100 
supra, at 211 et seq. 
107 Art. III, par. A, subpar. 5 of the statute. This provision was first included in the 
twelve-power draft. 
10s Statute, Art. III, par. A, subpar. 5, Mr. Khoman, representative from Thailand, 
remarked in the Conference: ". • • [I]f for no other reasons than those of equality and 
equity, as well as the reason that the eventual establishment of world-wide security from 
atomic danger is possible, these safeguards shall not be restricted to the present bound-
aries but extended to all the countries of the world." Emphasis added. IAEA/CS/OR.15, 
p. 65. 
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Soviet Union has on a number of occasions stated that it will 
supply fissionable materials to other countries without any safe-
guards excepting an agreement by those countries to devote the 
materials only to peaceful purposes.109 However, to date the 
Soviet Union has apparently not offered sufficiently significant 
quantities of fissionable materials to countries other than those 
which it fully controls to create any substantial danger of their 
diversion to purposes of war. 
Thus the functions of the Agency have been expanded to 
permit full assumption of responsibility for universal safeguarqs 
if and when the Great Powers agree. 
Most of the inter-governmental discussions of the relationship 
of the Agency to·bilateral or multilateral programs of cooperation 
have concentrated on the systems of safeguards. However, the 
success or failure of the Agency will depend equally upon working 
out a proper relationship on other phases of the program. It is 
apparent that the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union can, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, 
make available all types of assistance which the Agency might 
provide. If the terms offered by one of these states are more 
favorable than those offered by the Agency or if the procedures 
are less cumbersome, then there would be little incentive for a 
state to request assistance from the Agency. 
If the Agency is to play a meaningful role in the development 
of the peaceful uses of the atom, it will be necessary to work out 
some form of relationship between the Agency program and bi-
lateral and multilateral programs. Three possible types of relation-
ship immediately suggest themselves. 
1. The United States (and also the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union) might gradually arrange for the Agency to 
take over the bilateral and multilateral programs in their entirety. 
Some of the recent bilateral agreements of the United States 
109 Mr. Zarubin, representative of the Soviet Union, stated at the Conference: "The 
Agency should impose upon no country control that might infringe upon its sovereign 
rights .•.. It is ••• necessary to note that the agreement on the peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy concluded between the Soviet Union and other countries does not contain 
any conditions which might infringe upon the sovereign rights of countries participating 
therein. The Soviet Union considers that a sufficient guarantee is to provide in the draft 
statute that countries must be obligated not to make use of the assistance which they 
receive from the Agency for the production of atomic weapons, and must submit reports 
with respect to the assistance received. The system of guarantees contemplated under the 
draft statute would have meaning if it had been connected with the prohibition of the 
atomic weapon and if it had been made applicable to both the recipient countries and 
the countries giving assistance." IAEA/CS/OR.3, pp. 31-35. For the position taken by the 
Soviet Union in regard to safeguards, see also Appendix G below. 
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provide for consultations between the parties after the establish-
ment of the Agency with a view to possible modifications of the 
agreements.11° However, any change in the agreements would re-
quire the consent of both parties. 
2. The bilateral and multilateral arrangements might con-
tinue with the parties requesting the Agency to assume the 
responsibility for the administraion of safeguards. The statute 
contemplates this possibility which was discussed above.111 
3. The bilateral and multilateral arrangements might con-
tinue to cover the same broad fields where the Agency furnishes 
assistance. In this event, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication 
of activities, it might be advisable for the three Great Powers to 
agree that certain specific types or sizes of reactors would be 
furnished with the assistance of the Agency while countries in 
their separate programs would concentrate on other types or sizes. 
EURATOM and the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation have under study the establishment of "common in-
stallations" (or "joint undertakings") such as isotope separation 
and chemical processing plants.112 Coordination of Agency activi-
ties with these multilateral arrangements will also be necessary. 
In the absence of some arrangement to correlate the various 
programs, the Agency might find that practically all feasible 
projects were being undertaken outside the Agency. 
Privileges and Immunities 
The statute grants the Agency such legal capacity and privileges 
and immunities in the territory of each member "as are necessary 
for the exercise of its functions."113 The delegates of the members 
and Governors (members of the Board) with their staff as well as 
the Director General and the staff of the Agency are accorded 
privileges and immunities "necessary in the independent exercise 
of their functions. . . . "114 Separate agreements to be negotiated 
between the Agency and the members are to define the legal capac-
ity, privileges, and immunities so conferred.116 These limited "func-
tional" privileges follow generally the provisions in the Charter of 
110 See note 105 supra. 
111 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpars. 5 and 6. 
112 On EURATOM "common installations," see "Report of the Intergovernmental 
Committee," note 100 supra, at 209-210. On O.E.E.C. "joint undertakings," see JOINT AcnON 
BY O.E.E.C. CouNTRIFS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 23-52 (1956). 
118 Statute, art. XV, par. A. 
114 Statute, art. XV, par. B. 
116 Statute, art. XV, par. C. 
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the United Nations and the statutes of some specialized agencies 
of the United Nations.116 
The question arises whether or not the grant of the legal 
capacity, privileges, and immunities was intended to become ef-
fective from the date of the ratification of the statute in the absence 
of separate agreements. It is pertinent to note that the final draft 
omits the eight-power draft provision to the effect that the require-
ment of separate agreements is "without prejudice to the im-
mediate effectiveness"117 of the grant of the legal capacity, privil-
eges, and immunities. 
Settlement of Disputes 
"Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application" of the statute, not settled by negotiation, "shall be 
referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with 
the Statute of the Court unless the parties concerned agree on 
another mode of settlement."118 In order to bring a matter before 
the Court under this provision, it will apparently be necessary 
for the parties t_o conclude a special agreement unless both parties 
had previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
The provision in the eight-power draft which would have con-
ferred unequivocally upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction in 
this matter has been abandoned.119 This is clearly a concession 
to the opposition on the part of the Soviet Union to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court in any form or shape. 
Both the General Conference and the Board of Governors "are 
separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General 
Assembly of the United Nations to request the International 
Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising 
within the scope of the Agency's activities."120 
116 See, e.g., art. 105 of the United Nations Charter, which, contrary to the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, does not provide for diplomatic immunities but only (as in the 
case of the Agency) for limited privileges. The provisions in the constitutions of other 
specialized agencies are similar. See, e.g., art. 67 of the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization; art. 40 of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. 
117 Art. XVII, par. C of the eight-power draft. 
118 Statute, art. XVII, par. A. 
119 Art. XIX, par. E, the relevant provision of the eight-power draft, read: "The 
Parties to the present Statute accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
with respect to any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Statute. Any 
such dispute may be referred by any Party concerned to the International Court of Justice 
for decision unless the Parties concerned agree on some other mode of settlement. • • ." 
Emphasis added. 
120 Statute, art. XVII, par. B. This provision is based on art. 96, par. 2 of the United 
Nations Charter which provides that "other organs of the United Nations and specialized 
agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also 
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The language of this article is broad enough to cover not only 
disputes among member states but also disputes between the 
Agency on one hand and a member on the other. The latter type 
of disputes would include differences arising between the Agency 
and a recipient state over the interpretation of a project agree-
ment. Under the statute, any such project agreement is to "make 
appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes."121 It is 
hoped that the Board will develop a formula to be included in 
all project agreements-for a speedy and binding solution of such 
disputes in the event the efforts at a settlement by the Director 
General and the Board should fail. A possible formula would be 
to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice for an 
advisory opinion which the parties would undertake to accept in 
advance.122 Another possible formula would be to provide for 
arbitration by a special commission which could develop into an 
expert judicial body on matters relating to atomic energy.123 
Financing of the Agency 
One of the most difficult problems confronting the Agency 
will be that of financing its operations. The reason, of course, is 
that most activities in the field of atomic energy involve vast 
expenditures. 
It is clear that the International Agency, at the outset, will 
have the financial resources to carry on only a small fraction of 
the total activities associated with the peaceful development of 
atomic energy. 
request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of 
their activities." It is of somewhat academic interest to speculate whether under this 
article, the Agency would be considered a "specialized agency." The Agency cannot be a 
party to a contentious proceeding before the International Court since the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides in art. 34, par. I, that only states can be parties in 
cases before it. 
121 Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 6. This provision originated in an amendment 
submitted by the Netherlands. IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 3. In view of its adoption, a 
Swiss amendment (IAEA/CS/Art. XVII/Amend. I/Corr. 1) designed to provide for the 
settlement of disputes of any kind and including disputes with the Agency was withdrawn. 
122 Although this formula by itself would of course not establish compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court over the Soviet Union, the Russians nevertheless may be expected to 
oppose it. They may oppose it perhaps somewhat less vigorously and-it is hoped-less 
successfully than the original text of the disputes article in the eight-power draft. For 
a possible procedure utilizing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 
an arbitration procedure see sec. 21 of the Headquarters Agreement between the United 
States and the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947. U. N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. Doc., 
Second Session (1947), Resolutions, 169 (II), p. 91. 
123 As pointed out above, a beneficiary state cannot avoid or delay the measures im-
posed by the Board for noncompliance with the safeguards provisions by invoking the 
dispute settlement provisions contained in art. XVII or in the project agreement. Any 
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The statute recognizes four methods of financing Agency 
activities. First, administrative expenses124 will be included in a 
separate budget and apportioned among the members in accord-
ance with a scale to be fixed by the General Conference. The 
General Conference, in fixing this scale, shall be guided by the 
principles adopted by the United Nations in assessing contribu-
tions of member states to the regular budget of the United 
Nations.125 In the early years of the Agency, only a small fraction 
of the eighty-seven states eligible for initial membership will be 
the beneficiaries of power projects. Most of the remaining mem-
bers will be unwilling to accept large assessments which would 
be utilized for the general administration of the Agency without 
any direct benefit to them, thus limiting the funds assessed in 
this manner. 
A second method of financing the Agency would be through 
borrowing. Under rules and limitations to be approved by the 
General Conference the Board of Governors has the authority to 
exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency without, 
however, imposing on the individual members of the Agency any 
liability in respect of the loans.126 While the language of the 
statute is most ambiguous, presumably loans would be utilized 
chiefly for the construction of Agency facilities and not for the 
day-to-day operations of the Agency.127 
A third method of financing is through voluntary contributions. 
The Board of Governors is authorized to accept voluntary monetary 
effort to provide for such avoidance or delay in the project agreement would seem to be 
contrary to the safeguards provisions of the statute, and particularly to art. XII, par. C. 
124 Administrative expenses are defined in art. XIV, par. B, subpar. I of the statute 
to include (a) costs of the staff of the Agency (other than the staff employed in connec-
tion with materials, services, equipment and facilities required in carrying out the Agency's 
functions or necessary for Agency projects); cost of meetings, expenditures required for 
the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of information, as well as (b) 
costs of implementing safeguards and expenses incurred in the "syphoning off" of special 
fissionable material not used for any project. The expenses under (a) are apportioned 
to the full extent. According to par. C of art. XIV, the expenses under (b) are apportioned 
only to the extent that they are not recoverable under agreements regarding the applica-
tion of safeguards between the agency and parties to bilateral and multilateral arrange-
ments. 
125 Statute, art. XIV, par. D. 
126 Statute, art. XIV, par. G. The provision that the members shall not be liable for 
loans was included on British initiative following a suggestion made by Yugoslavia. IA-
EA/CS/OR.31, p. 42. See also IAEA/CS/OR.32, p. 17 and pp. 60-61 for the British and 
U.S.S.R. positions in this matter. The amendment is contained in Conference Room Paper 
No. 12/Rev. 1. The Soviet Union opposed any borrowing power for the Agency. The 
amendment proposed by the Soviet Union to delete par. G (IAEA/CS/Art. XIV/Amend. 4) 
was rejected by 49 votes to 9, with 14 abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 22-
121 See appendix J. 
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contributions made to the Agency.128 There are a number of 
parallels for financing international bodies in this manner, 
for example, the United Nations agency supporting the Palestine 
refugees. However, the amount of voluntary contributions which 
states might be willing to make is likely to be limited. 
The fourth method of financing the Agency is through charges 
imposed in project agreements between the Agency and states re-
cipients of materials and services. Such charges will include costs 
of special fissionable materials and of their handling and storage 
and probably a large proportion of the cost of administering the 
system of safeguards.129 Here again there are practical limitations 
upon the funds that can be raised through such charges. The 
greater the charges the greater the cost of production of electric 
power utilizing atomic fuel. If the charges imposed under Agency 
agreements are onerous, the result will be to delay substantially 
the time when atomic power will be competitive with conventional 
power. Furthermore, if the charges are greater under the Agency 
program than under bilateral programs, states will be discouraged 
in utilizing the Agency. On the other hand, there may be no other 
practical way to finance the safeguards system. One possible 
solution for this dilemma would be for states contributing fission-
able and other materials to contribute those materials to the 
Agency at less than cost. There is nothing in the statute which 
would prevent such an indirect subsidy of the Agency.130 
128 Statute, art. XIV, par. G, last clause. This provision was included in the statute 
as a result of an amendment submitted by Egypt, Indonesia, and Syria. IAEA/CS/Art. 
XIV/Amend. 2, as revised by Conference Room Paper No. IO. The Soviet Union pro-
posed an amendment to add a new par. E to art. XIV providing for financing of expenses 
under par. B, subpar. 2, to the extent that they concern the acquisition of Agency-owned 
materials, facilities and equipment, by voluntary contributions. IAEA/CS/Art. XIV/Amend. 
4. This amendment was rejected by 52 votes to IO, with IO abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.36. 
pp. 24-25. 
129 Statute, art. XIV, par. B, subpars. l (b) and 2. 
130 As stated previously, contributions of fissionable and other materials to the Agency 
will be made on terms agreed upon between the Agency and each individual state making 
the contribution. Statute, art. IX, pars. A and B. The agreement between the contri-
buting state and the Agency might provide for furnishing the material at cost, at less than 
cost or at more than cost. There is nothing in the statute to require the Agency to pay 
uniform sums to the states making the contributions. Chairman Strauss of the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission, in his statement to the International Conference on October 26, 
1956 (IAEA/CS/OR.40, p. 2 et seq.), indicated that the United States contributions would 
be "on comparable terms" to the contributions made by other members. Id. at 7. It thus 
would be possible for the United States and other contributors to adjust the amount 
they charge to the Agency in such a manner that the cost of fissionable materials to 
recipient states including surcharges for operation of the safeguard system would be 
comparable to the cost of fissionable materials furnished under the bilateral programs. 
It should be noted that under the bilateral programs of the United States the net cost of 
fissionable materials to cooperating states is reduced through the amounts which the United 
States pays to such states for the plutonium by-product recovered when the fuel elements 
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Amendment Procedures 
Amendments to the statute come into effect when approved 
by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority and "by two-
thirds of all the Members in accordance with their respective con-
stitutional processes."131 
A member unwilling to accept an amendment to the statute 
may withdraw from the Agency at any time but must fulfill its 
contractual obligations to the Agency.132 In theory, at least, this 
right to withdraw from the Agency protects a member against 
unacceptable amendments which would make basic changes in 
the rights and obligations of membership. In practice, however, 
if the Agency becomes a truly important source of assistance it 
might not be feasible for a state to withdraw. In all probability, 
agreements between the Agency and its members for the supply 
of special fissionable materials will result in obligations extending 
over a number of years.133 It might be wise for a state furnishing 
fissionable materials to provide specifically in its agreement with 
the Agency for the termination of its obligation to furnish the 
materials in the event of its withdrawal from the Agency because 
of an amendment to which it was unwilling to agree. Likewise, 
the obligations of a state receiving assistance from the Agency 
will presumably extend for the life of the project and would make 
a withdrawal difficult. This raises the problem of the status of 
a power reactor constructed with assistance of the Agency if the 
state where the reactor is located withdraws from the Agency. 
Presumably the agreement between the Agency and the recipient 
state would cover this contingency. The statute provides that 
withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect its 
contractual obligations entered into pursuant to the provisions 
governing Agency projects. 
United States Cooperation With the Agency 
The statute appears to conform to the concept of "an inter-
national arrangement" for an "international atomic pool" into 
which the President was "authorized" by the Congress to enter 
are chemically reprocessed in the United States. The Agency would not be in a position 
to make similar payments until the technology of utilizing plutonium for peaceful pur-
poses is further advanced so as to allow the Agency to make profitable use of it. 
131 Statute, art. XVIII, par. C. 
132 Statute, art. XVIII, pars. D and E. 
133 For considerations concerning the duration of obligations of member states con-
tributing materials, see pp. 768-769 supra. 
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by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.134 The adherence of the United 
States to such an "arrangement" under the act may become ef-
fective either upon approval by the Congress or upon advice and 
consent by the Senate (as a treaty).135 
To meet the other conditions of the Act of 1954 for the United 
States cooperation with the Agency, it would be necessary-un-
less the act is modified-for the Atomic Energy Commission to 
negotiate with the Agency periodic "agreements for cooperation" 
specifying the amounts and terms of the United States contribu-
tion of fissionable materials for a given period.136 The safeguards 
provisions of the Agency statute might be considered sufficient 
to enable the Agency to undertake in the agreement for coopera-
tion the guarantees against diversion of materials to military 
purposes required in the act. Upon completion of the negotiations, 
the Commission will have to recommend approval of the agree-
ment to the President. Before approving it, the President will 
have to make "a determination in writing" that it "will promote 
and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common 
defense and security." If it can be assumed that the participation 
of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the "international atomic 
pool" was contemplated by the Congress, such determination 
134Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. m, 1956) §2154 (P.L. 703, §124). 
185 Id., §§2154 and 2014 (k) (P.L. 703, §124, §11 k). The statute provides for "rati-
fication or acceptance" in accordance with "respective constitutional processes." Art. XXI, 
par. D. For discussion of §2154 (P.L. 703, §124) and generally of subchapter X (P.L 
703, ch. 11) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on International Activities, see Cole, "The 
Meaning of the New Atomic Law," NuCLEONic.5, p. 12 (March 1955); Wit, "Some Inter-
national Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 I.Aw AND CONTEM. PROB. 167-169 
(1956). For a discussion of the provisions of the act concerning international activities 
generally see Ruebhausen, "New Atomic Problems," 9 N.Y. CITY BAR AssN. REc., 368 
(1954). See also University of Michigan Law School, Summer Institute, WORKSHOPS ON 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC ENERGY 63-84 (1956). 
136 Sec. 2154 (P.L. 703, §124) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. m, 
1956), contemplates that the United States' cooperation with the "pool" will be "pur-
suant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 2153 of 
this title." Sec. 2153 (P.L. 703, §123) provides for such an agreement with "any nation 
or regional defense organization." Since the Agency is not a "regional defense organiza-
tion," the question may be asked whether under §2153 (P.L. 703, §123) an agreement 
with the Agency is possible. This question clearly must be answered in the affirmative 
since in the absence of new legislation any other arrangement in the general context of the 
act and the Agency's statute would seem to be impracticable. It could perhaps be said 
that the giving of advice and consent by the Senate to the Statute (or the approval by Con-
gress of the Statute), since the statute provides for agreement between individual contribu-
tors (such as the United States) and the Agency, supersedes §§ 2153 and 2154 (P.L. 703, 
§123, 124) to the extent that they are interpreted as precluding a bilateral agreement be-
tween the United States and the "international atomic pool." Cf. in House of Repre-
sentatives Report No. 2181 on amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, "Separate Views 
on International Activities" and "Separate Views of Representative Holifield and Rep-
resentative Price on H.R. 9757," reprinted in ATOMS FOR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, at 
156-160 and 161 at 190-193. 
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would be possible. Finally, before it could come into effect the 
proposed agreement-after approval by the President-would have 
to lie before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the 
Congress for thirty days while the Congress is in session. The pro-
visions of the Agency statute do not seem incompatible with the 
procedure required by the Atomic Energy Act interpreted in the 
above fashion. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the Agency statute 
itself envisages notification by the member of contributions made 
available "in conformity with its laws" and periodic agreements 
with contributors determining the terms of the contributions.137 
However, the cumbersome nature of this procedure and the legal 
problems involved suggest the desirability for a firmer legal basis 
for the United States cooperation with the Agency. This may 
have been in the mind of the President when he declared his 
intention to present the Agency statute "for official ratification 
by our Senate, ... and to request appropriate Congressional au-
thority to transfer special nuclear materials" to the Agency.138 If 
this indicates the President's intention to propose an amendment 
to the Act of 1954 it is hoped that such amendment would provide 
a procedure for cooperation not only with the Agency but also 
with certain regional arrangements such as EURA TOM, to which 
the United States has given strong encouragement. 
Arµong the guarantees which the Agency would be required 
to give to the United States under the present Atomic Energy 
Act is the undertaking that any material supplied by the United 
States will not be transferred "beyond the jurisdiction" of the 
Agency except as specified in the agreement itself.139 The Atomic 
Energy Act does not specify the form of the legal transaction (sale, 
lease, etc.) through which the United States fissionable material 
may be made available under an agreement for cooperation.139a 
It does provide that the title to all such material "within or under 
the jurisdiction of the United States" shall be vested in the United 
States Government140 but it is silent with respect to the title to 
such materials distributed abroad. The United States bilateral 
agreements provide for either a lease or a sale of such materials 
to the cooperating government with the further provision in the 
case of sale that the title must remain vested in that government 
137 Statute, art. IX, par. C. 
138 See President Eisenhower's message read by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission to the International Conference on October 26, 1956. IAEA/CS/OR.40, p 6. 
189 Par. a (4) of §2153 (P.L. 703, §123) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 
(Supp. m, 1956). 
189a See id., §2074. 
HO Id., §2072 and §2012 (h). 
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(and not passed to a private party under its jurisdiction) as long 
as private ownership of fissionable materials is not recognized in 
the United States.141 
It is hoped that within the framework of the Atomic Energy 
Act and the Agency statute the Board of Governors will be able 
to work out with the Atomic Energy Commission a formula 
which would allow the Agency to make use of the United States 
contribution in the form most suitable to a given transaction 
keeping in mind, of course, that under the statute no member 
"shall have the right to require" that its contribution be "kept 
separately" or used for a designated purpose.142 Neither the con-
cept of a lease nor that of a sale may necessarily fit the actual 
arrangements desired. 
Conclusions 
The Agency as originally conceived had the twofold objective 
of making available the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy on a worldwide basis and at the same time making a 
beginning in the direction of worldwide limitation of armaments 
through syphoning off to peaceful uses a portion of the materials 
available for nuclear weapons. For long periods of time during 
the negotiations the outlook for any tangible achievement toward 
either of these objectives was clouded. During the year immediately 
following the President's address to the United Nations, it ap-
peared that the Soviet Union might not be a member and that 
the Agency might have limited membership largely confined to 
Western Europe and Latin America. 
The statute in its present form looks forward to a substantial 
contribution by the Agency to the peaceful development of atomic 
energy on a worldwide basis. However, largely because of the 
vast cost of the necessary facilities, for some years, its role is 
likely to be less significant than the role of national, bilateral 
and multilateral regional programs.143 The safeguards system 
developed in the statute should play a major role in delaying and 
perhaps preventing the development of nuclear weapons programs 
141 The sale arrangement is used in "power bilaterals," e.g., art. VII of the Agree-
ment with Australia, 102 CoNG. REc. 10412 at 10413 CTune 29, 1956). The lease arrange-
ment is used in "research bilaterals,'' e.g., art. IV of the Agreement with New Zealand. 
Id. at 10403. 
The EURATOM plan contemplates that with certain qualifications the EURATOM 
will have the option to purchase uncommitted quantities of source and fissionable ma-
terial of the member states and will be the exclusive source of supply of such material for 
the members. "Report of Intergovernmental Committee,'' note 100 supra, at 210-213. 
142 Statute, art. IX, par. J. 
143 E.g., an Agency gaseous diffusion plant is an unlikely development for many years. 
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in countries other than the three now possessing such weapons, 
but will play little if any role in reducing the existing nuclear 
weapons potential of the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union. It could immediately assume a much greater 
significance in the disarmament picture if the Great Powers could 
agree on the United States' suggestion made in the disarmament 
negotiations that all future production of fissionable material be 
utilized for peaceful purposes under adequate controls.144 
In the eyes of the world, the success of the Agency is likely 
to be gauged by its progress toward establishment of power plants 
utilizing atomic fuel in the various areas of the world. The pro-
visions in the statute regarding the powers, composition and 
manner of selection of the Board of Governors can be justified 
to the world only if the Agency in the near future disposes of 
substantial quantities of fissionable materials for this purpose. 
There are many hurdles in the path of rapid progress toward 
atomic power on a worldwide basis. The power plants cannot be 
established until the safeguards system is ready to operate. Yet 
the safeguards system cannot be worked out until a program for 
power production is well along in the planning stage since the 
details of the safeguards system will depend upon the size and type 
of power reactors that are visualized. Similarly, the standards of 
health and safety must be established prior to the power plants 
going critical. 
Assuming as we may on the basis of the assurances given by 
the United States and the United Kingdom that the ~gency will 
have a sufficient amount of fissionable materials to start operating, 
progress toward the goals of the Agency will, nevertheless, be 
slowed down by a shortage of trained technical personnel and 
a shortage of finances. The lack of available capital will affect 
not only the budget of the Agency but also national programs. 
Much skillful planning and action lie ahead to surmount these 
obstacles. The success of the undertaking depends also in large 
measure on securing for both the Agency staff and the Board of 
Governors individuals with the highest technical competence and 
the creative imagination necessary to visualize the Agency program 
and carry it out successfully.145 
144E.g., par. 3 of United Nations Disarmament Commission Document DC/87, of 
July 3, 1956, draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States in the Disarmament Commission. 
145 The experience in negotiating the statute of the Agency has created a useful pre-
cedent for preparing drafting international legislation under U.N. auspices. Rather than 
trying to draft a treaty in a committee of the General Assembly, it is preferable to organize 
a small but representative group such as the twelve-power group including those most 




BRIEF SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC 
ENERGY AGENCY 
I. First Phase of Diplomatic Correspondence Between the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
The first outline of a statute for an agency of the kind envisaged in 
President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, was contained in 
a United States Department of State memorandum handed to Soviet 
Ambassador Zarubin on March 19, 1954. This memorandum is the first 
in a series of six documents representing the first phase of the corre-
spondence between the United States and the Soviet Union, covering the 
period from March 19 to September 23, 1954. For the text of these docu-
ments see ATOMS FoR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, at 266-283; also U.N. 
GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. R.Ec., 9th Session (1954), Annexes, Agenda Item 67, 
p. 4 (Doc. A/2738). The outline already contained many features of the 
Agency in its present form. In its reply the Soviet Union claimed that 
the United States memorandum evaded the problem of nuclear weapons 
and would tend to intensify the atomic armament race. Soviet Union 
Aide Memoire of April 27, 1954, in ATOMS FOR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, 
269 at 271-272. Later on, however, the Soviet Union indicated its willing-
ness to separate the issues of disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. Soviet Union Aide Memoire of September 22, 1954, id. at 278 et seq. 
2. Negotiations of Eight States 
Ambassador Morehead Patterson, U. S. representative in the original 
negotiating group consisting of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portu-
gal, the Union of South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom, 
describes the development that followed the discussion in the 9th General 
Assembly in the fall of 1954: "The United States prepared a first draft 
of the Statute taking into consideration suggestions received from other 
negotiating States and also from the United Nations General Assembly 
debates. This draft was then submitted to the negotiating States on March 
29, 1955. During April and May the United States discussed this draft 
with all the negotiating States · and also received further comments from 
interested agencies of the United States Government which had not 
participated in the original drafting. 
"After a thorough discussion, it developed that there was sufficient 
unanimity among all negotiating states so that substantially all of the 
vitally interested in the project. This group would then prepare the draft treaty and sub-
mit it to an international conference of all members with the understanding that it should 
not be changed except as a result of a demand by two-thirds of the members. During the 
negotiations, intermediate reports could well be made to the General Assembly which 
might discuss the progress and the chief issues without entering, however, into the drafting 
process. 
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suggested changes could be reconciled and incorporated into a new draft 
of the Statute. This new draft was transmitted to the Soviet Union on a 
confidential basis on July 29, 1955, and its comments were requested. 
It was distributed by the United States on behalf of the negotiating States 
also on a confidential basis to all eighty-four States Members of the 
United Nations or of the specialized agencies on August 22, 1955. Com-
ments on the Statute were requested from all States." Report of Ambas-
sador Morehead Patterson, 34 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 5 at 6 (1956). 
3. Discussion in the Ninth General Assembly 
The question of the Agency came up for the first time for general 
international discussion in the 9th General Assembly. (See U. N. GENERAL 
AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 9th Session (1954), Plenary Meetings, A/PV. 475, p. 17 
at 25, A/PV. 478, p. 63 at 66, A/PV. 503, p. 339 at 339-349; First Committee, 
A/C.1/SR. 707-725, pp. 289-387, Annexes, Agenda Item 67.) The debates 
there led to the unanimous adoption of a draft resolution which referred 
to " ... negotiations ... in progress ... for the establishment of an Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency ... ," expressed the hope that " ... the 
International Agency will be established without delay ... ,'' and suggested 
that " ... once the Agency is established, it negotiate an appropriate form 
of agreement with the United Nations ... ," and that " ... Members of 
the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved in the establish-
ment of the Agency and that the views of members which have mani-
fested their interest be fully considered .... " Resolution 810 (IX), Docu-
ment A/Resolution/230, in U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 9th Session 
(1954), Annexes, Agenda Item 67, pp. 24-25. For the report of the First 
Committee, see id. at 22-23. 
4. Second Phase of Diplomatic Correspondence Between the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
In the second series of notes (Department of State Press Release No. 
527, Oct. 6, 1956, containing fifteen notes exchanged between Nov. 3, 1954 
and Jan. 27, 1956) the Soviet Union demanded that the Agency be closely 
connected with the United Nations (in particular the Security Council) 
and that no member should have a "privileged position" within the 
Agency. 
The United States, in a note of April 14, 1955 (id. at 8, 9), expressed its 
willingness to consider these comments and made · clear that it kept the 
door open for the Soviet Union to join the negotiating group. It stated, 
however, its intention in the meantime to carry on the negotiations regard-
less of Soviet participation. The United States furthermore submitted an 
agenda for a joint discussion by experts of both countries on safeguards 
against diversion of fissionable materials. 
The U.S.S.R., on July 18, 1955 (id. at 11-13), declared its readiness to 
participate in the negotiations and agreed to deposit 50 kilograms of 
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fissionable materials with the Agency as soon as agreement on the creation 
of the Agency has been reached. Again it referred to principles which it 
considered basic, among them the participation of all nations (obviously 
designed to bring in Red China) in the Agency with no privileged 
position for any state. The joint study of safeguards should take place 
after the completion of the scientific conference in Geneva scheduled for 
the summer of 1955. 
In its answer of July 29, 1955 (id. at 14-15), the United States trans-
mitted the draft statute worked out by the 8-power negotiating group 
(note 14 supra), which was identical with the draft distributed on August 22, 
1955 to all members of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies, 
except for two minor changes. Later on the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agreed on 
the conference of experts on the safeguards to include also experts from 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France and the United Kingdom. On Oct. 1, 1955 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union wrote to the American 
Embassy (id. at 22-24) that the 8-power draft could, with certain amend-
ments, serve as a basis for drawing up the charter of an atomic energy 
agency. The permanent members of the Security Council should become 
permanent members of the Agency's Board of Governors. There should be 
a strong control mechanism, with inspectors investigating atomic installa-
tions of countries receiving aid under provisions which should give "due 
regard to the sovereign rights of the states." India, Indonesia, Egypt and 
Rumania should be added to an increased first Board of Governors. A 3/4 
majority in the Board and the General Conference should be necessary 
for financial decisions. In conformity with the 8-power draft, these Soviet 
proposals now envisaged the Agency acting not only as a clearing house 
but also as a "bank" for fissionable materials. The International Court 
of Justice should not have compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising 
from the application of the statute. After the discussion of the Agency 
in the 10th General Assembly (see infra), the exchange was continued 
in a United States note of Jan. 27, 1956 (id. at 25) suggesting further 
discussions at a twelve nation working group meeting scheduled for Feb. 
27, 1956. 
The remaining portion of the exchange between the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. is concerned with the problem of safeguards, in particular 
the possible extension of safeguards to existing international arrange-
ments (see note 66 supra). 
5. Discussion in the Tenth General Assembly 
The main points of discussion in the 10th General Assembly of the 
United Nations were the relationship between the Agency on one hand 
and the United Nations and its specialized agencies on the other; fair 
representation of states, both in regard to the negotiations on the Statute 
and in the mode of selection and voting of the Board of Governors; 
universality of membership; and the relationship of the Agency to regional 
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or bilateral programs outside the Agency. See U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. 
R.Ec., 10th Session (1955), First Committee, A/C.1/SR. 757-772, pp. 5-93. A 
resolution was adopted unanimously [Resolution 912 (X) Document 
A/3116, in U. N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. R.Ec., 10th Session, Supp. 19 
(A/3116), pp 4-5,] welcoming the intention of the nations sponsoring the 
draft statute of the Agency to invite all members of the United Nations 
and its specialized agencies to a conference on the final text of the statute; 
welcoming the invitations extended to Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and 
the U.S.S.R. to join the sponsors; recommending that the sponsors take 
into account the views expressed by the Agency during the debates in 
the United Nations and the comments made directly to the sponsors; 
recommending that measures be taken to establish the Agency without 
delay; and requesting that the Secretary General in consultation with his 
Advisory Committee study the question of the Agency's relationship to 
the United Nations and transmit the results of this study to the sponsors 
before the conference. 
6. Negotiations of the Twelve States 
A working group consisting of representatives of the original eight 
negotiating powers and of the representatives of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, 
India and the U.S.S.R. met in Washington from Feb. 27 to April 18, 1956 
for further discussion of the draft statute. The report of the working level 
meeting dated July 2, 1956 reads (in part): " ... [T]he Group reviewed 
each article of the Statute, together with the proposed amendments, 
taking into account the comments advanced during the proceedings of 
the tenth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly as 
well as those of the thirty-nine States which submitted observations on 
the Statute in response to a request made by the initial Negotiating Group 
in August 1955 to all States Members of the United Nations and its 
Specialized Agencies. . . .At the final plenary session on April 18, 1956, 
the Negotiating Group approved, ad referendum, the revised text of the 
draft Statute. . . . While the Australian, Czechoslovak, Indian and Soviet 
Delegations reserved their positions on certain provisions of the Statute, 
. . . all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a whole. . . . At the 
same session, the Group agreed that a conference should be convened at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York in the latter part of September 
1956 to discuss, approve and open for signature the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency .... The Group also unanimously 
approved the Agenda and Rules of Procedure for the Conference." Report 
of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Doc. 31, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1956, pp. 1, 2. 
APPENDIX B 
(footnote 19) 
Art. V, par. D, subpar. 2 of the twelve-power draft mentioned as one 
of the functions of the General Conference "to admit new Members in 
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accordance with Article IV." This was changed in art. V, par. E, subpar. 2 
of the final text to read "to approve states for membership in accordance 
with Article IV." (Emphasis added.) The change was perhaps motivated 
by the desire to make it clear beyond any doubt that a favorable recom• 
mendation by the Board is necessary for the admission of a new member. 
The drafters may have had in mind the advisory proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice on the question whether a favorable recom-
mendation from the Security Council is required for admission of a 
state to the United Nations by the General Assembly. The Court answered 
this question in the affirmative. Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice of March 3, 1950, in I.C.J. Reports of Judgments, Ad-
visory Opinions and Orders, 1950, p. 4 at 10. 
In approving states for membership under this paragraph the Board 
of Governors and the General Conference make the determination "that 
the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership 
in the agency." Statute, art. IV, par. B. In making this determination 
"due consideration" is to be given to the state's ability and willingness 
to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations. The eight power draft would have had the Board of 
Governors and the General Conference each make two determinations: 
first, that the state was in a position to carry out the obligations of the 
Agency, and second, that the state was able and willing to carry out the 
obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations. This would 
have excluded Switzerland which considers that it is not in a position 




The powers of the General Conference were a much debated item 
in the International Conference on the statute of the Agency. Apart from 
the additional powers already mentioned, the International Conference 
provided for the authority of the General Conference to approve the 
appointment by the Board of the Agency's chief executive, the Director 
General. See art. V, par. E, subpar. IO and art. VII, par. A. This originated 
in an Indonesian-Pakistan amendment. IAEA/CS/Art. V/Amend. 8. The 
amendment was adopted by 77 votes to l, with l abstention. IAEA/CS/OR. 
22, p. 43. 
Already before the discussions in the International Conference, the 
powers of the General Conference had been controversial matter. The 
smaller nations, not being represented on the Board of Governors, wanted 
to accord more authority to the General Conference. In response to the 
suggestions made to the negotiating parties, the 12-power draft added a 
provision in art. V, par. E, subpar. 3 giving the General Conference the 
power to "propose matters for consideration by the Board and request 
from the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the 
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Agency" (now art. V, par. F, subpar. 2 of the statute). Furthermore, 
the reference to the policy making power of the Board in art. VII, par. H 
of the eight-power draft no longer appears in the twelve-power draft and 
the statute. The powers of the General Conference other than those 
mentioned earlier are: 
To elect the ten members of the Board mentioned in art. VI, par. A, 
subpar. 3 of the Statute (art. V, par. E, subpar. I); 
To determine the place of its sessions (art. V, par. A); 
To elect a President and other officers (art. V, par. C); 
To adopt its rules of procedure (art. V, par. C); 
To request the Director General to convene special sessions (art. V, 
par.A); 
To approve States for membership upon recommendation by the Board 
(art. IV, par. B); 
To suspend members (art. XIX); 
To consider the Board's annual report (art. V, par. E, subpar. 4); 
To approve or return to the Board reports to the United Nations (art. 
V, par. E, subpar. 6; art. III, par. B, subpars. 4 and 5); 
To approve or return to the Board agreements between the Agency and 
the United Nations or other international agencies (art. V, par. E, subpar. 
7; art. XVI, par. A); 
To approve rules regarding (a) the exercise of borrowing powers by the 
Board (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8; art XIV, par. G); (b) the acceptance of 
voluntary contributions to the Agency (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8; art XIV, 
par. E); (c) the use of the g','!neral fund (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8; art. XIV, 
par. F); 
To approve amendments of the Statute (art. V, par. E, subpar. 9; art. 
XVIII, par. C (i)). 
It seems that the enumeration in art. V is exclusive, i.e., the Conference 
has no other powers besides the ones specifically mentioned. A Polish 
amendment (IAEA/CS/Art.V /Am.end.I) to art. V proposed to insert at the 
beginning of the functions of the Conference a sentence reading "to deter-
mine the general policy of the Agency." This amendment, in effect a gen-
eral clause granting additional powers to the Conference, was rejected by 
37 votes to 24, with 18 abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 42. 
The voting procedures of the Conference are laid down in art. V, par. C. 
Every member of the Agency has one vote. Except for decisions on financial 
questions (art. XIV, par. H), approval of amendments (art. XVIII, par. C 
(i)), and the suspension of privileges (art. XIX, par. B), which requires a 
2/3 majority, decisions are made by the majority of members present and 
voting, the majority of members constituting a quorum. Simple majority 
suffices for the determination of what additional questions are to be decided 
by a 2/3 majority. 




The eight-power draft, art. VII, par. A, subpars. I and 2, as well as the 
first outline of the statute, art. II, par. C, subpar. I, third sentence [ATOMS 
FOR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, 266 et seq.], envisaged actual contribu-
tions as a prerequisite for selection to the non-elective seats on the Board. 
This prerequisite was dropped in the twelve-power draft. In the Inter-
national Conference on the Statute, Denmark and Iran jointly submitted 
an amendment to art. VI, par. A, subpar. I, which provided that in des-
ignating members of the Board under this sub-paragraph the contributions 
to the Agency should be taken into consideration. IAEA/CS/Art.VI/ 
Amend. 2. In explaining this amendment the Danish representative said: 
"The main idea behind the Agency is that countries which are advanced 
and which are producing source material should give to other countries ... 
their aid and their help .... [S]tress should be laid also on the contribu-
tions •.. because that is really the main point in the building up of this 
idea. . . • [N]o one in this room will suggest that any member elected on 
the basis of advanced technology and of production of source materials 
should be allowed to sit if that member were not willing to make contribu-
tions and was not actually making contributions." IAEA/CS/OR.19, p. 27. 
The Philippine representative remarked: "[T]hat paragraph [i.e., art. VI, 
par. A, subpar. 2] mentions 'producers ... .' However, what good would that 
do as far as the Agency is concerned unless they make a contribution?" 
IAEA/CS/OR.19, pp. 29-30. In arguing against the amendment, Mr. du 
Plessis (Union of South Africa) pointed to the difficulty of evaluating con-
tributions and deciding what transactions were to be regarded as contribu-
tions. IAEA/CS/OR.20, p. 26 et seq. Subsequently, this amendment was 
withdrawn. See IAEA/CS/OR.23, p. 3. 
The composition of the Board in its present form is somewhat com-
parable to that of the Council of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Art. 17, Convention of the IMCO. For the text of 
this convention, which is not yet in force, see 18 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 499 
et seq. (1948). There six members with the largest interest in the interna-
tional seaborne trade and six with the largest interest in providing inter-
national shipping services are represented in this Council, together with 4 
members elected by the Assembly of the IMCO. Other international or-
ganizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the International Monetary Fund have a system of weighted vot-
ing, based on actual contributions. See art. V, sec. 3 of the Articles of 
Agreement of the IBRD, and art. XII, sec. 5, of the Articles of Agreement 
of the IMF. Certain other organizations have all-elected executive bodies 
with one vote for each member, e.g., the United Nations Food and Agricul-
tural Organization; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization; the World Health Organization and the World Meteorologi-
cal Organization. 




See IAEA/CS/OR.39, p. 61. The six states elected were Egypt, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Japan, Argentina and Peru. Apart from these six elected mem-
bers, the Preparatory Commission is composed of representatives of Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, 
Union of South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The Commission comes into existence with the opening of the 
statute for signature and continues till the first General Conference has 
convened and the first Board of Governors has been selected. Statute, Annex 
I, par. A. The functions of this Commission are of a provisional nature. 
Apart from organizing itself and appointing its staff it is to make arrange-
ments for the first session of the General Conference. This includes the 
preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure. The 
Commission is to designate members of the first Board in accordance with 
art. VI, pars. A and B; to make studies, reports and recommendations on 
various important problems for the first meetings of the Board and the 
Conference; and, finally, to enter into negotiations with the United Nations 
for a draft agreement on the relationship of the Agency to the United 
Nations and to make recommendations to the first sessions of the Confer-
ence and of the Board in regard to the relationship to other international 
organizations. Annex I, par. C, subpars. 1-7. 
APPENDIX F 
(footnote 57) 
The specific question of the Agency's relation to the specialized agen-
cies for which the Statute provides in art. XVI, par. A is dealt with in a 
memorandum by the executive heads of the specialized agencies presented 
to the International Conference (IAEA/CS/6, Sept. 24, 1956). In this memo-
randum attention was called to par. 9 of the United Nations, Doc. A/3122 
(reproduced in IAEA/CS/5, Sept. 24, 1956), which calls for effective co-
ordination between the activities of the Agency and those of the specialized 
agencies, with the aim of avoiding overlapping and duplication of activi-
ties. The annex to the memorandum contains comments by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO), which seem to indicate a tendency not to relinquish much of the 
jurisdiction of these bodies to the Agency. Thus it was the opinion of the 
ILO that the protection of the health and safety of the workers cannot be 
the responsibility of an agency dealing solely with atomic energy. ILO felt 
that the present position, whereby the draft statute fails to make any ex-
plicit provision for cooperation with the ILO, but specifically authorizes 
the Agency "to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health 
and minimization of danger to life and property (including standards for 
labor conditions)," called for further consideration at the Conference. 
IAEA/CS/6/Annex. See also the statements of the representatives of various 
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specialized agencies in the International Conference on October 4, 1956. 
IAEA/CS/OR.16, p. 31 et seq. 
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. 1, the Agency is given responsibilities in 
connection with "research on, and development and practical application 
of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world .•.. " The Food 
and Agricultural Organization includes among its functions "to stimulate 
and coordinate the use of radiation and radioisotopes in agricultural re-
search and development, and to promote necessary investigations of the 
possible effects of radioactive materials on agriculture and food production." 
F AO is organizing an information service on the applications of atomic 
energy in agriculture and related fields. United Nations, Economic and 
Social Council, Doc. E/2931, Annex II, October 18, 1956, p. 7. 
UNESCO authorized its Director General "to study and, if necessary, to 
propose measures of an international scope to facilitate the use of radio-
isotopes in research and industry." Id. at 9. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development states: 
"In carrying out its responsibilities, both to itself and to its members, in 
respect of the foregoing the IBRD will, from time to time, undertake studies 
of general and specific power needs, and the relationship of atomic fuels to 
conventional energy resources." Id. at 19. 
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. 3 the Agency is authorized "to foster the 
exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic 
energy." Under par. A, subpar. 4 of this article the Agency is authorized 
"to encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the 
fields of peaceful uses of atomic energy." UNESCO'$ program of work in-
cludes an item entitled "Training of Specialists." UNESCO proposes to 
convene an international conference "to organize a far-reaching exchange 
of information on the methods at present in use in various countries for 
training engineers, technicians, laboratory research workers and, in gen-
eral, all the different scientific specialists who are concerned with the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy." Id. at II. The conference will also recommend 
to UNESCO "action at the international level to secure the most efficient 
cooperation possible among the various countries; in particular, problems 
relating to exchange of teachers and students will have to be considered." 
Id. at 12. 
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. 6 the Agency is given certain functions in 
developing standards of safety for protection of health and minimization 
of danger to life and property (including such standards for labor condi-
tions), and to provide for the application of these standards to its own 
operations as well as to other operations coming under the jurisdiction of 
the Agency. The International Labor Organization states "the most imme-
diate problems of concern to ILO is the protection of workers against ioniz-
ing radiations." Id. at 3. It is also planned to issue codes of practice 
dealing with the technical protective measures required in industrial and 
other undertakings. In addition, ILO will be able to provide advice and 
assistance to governments and industry in the training of specialized safety 
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personnel and inspectors." Id. at 5. The World Health Organization has 
adopted a provisional program of work which includes training of special-
ists for health protection in atomic energy laboratories or plants, public 
health administrators and medical users of radioisotopes. The WHO also 
includes in its program the entire subject of the "health problems involved 
in the control of the location of reactors and in radioactive waste disposal 
from factories, laboratories and hospitals." Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
The World Meteorological Organization has an extensive program con-
cerning collection and analysis of atmospheric radioactivity and its relation 
to health and safety. Id. at 22. 
APPENDIX G 
(footnote 65) 
The history of the Soviet attitude toward the safeguards provisions is 
of considerable interest. The first outline of an International Atomic 
Energy Agency (see Appendix A above) in art. III, par. B, subpar. 3 in-
cluded provisions for both health and safety standards and safeguards 
against diversion of fissionable materials. Mr. Molotov, in his reply of 
April 27, 1954 (in ATOMS FOR PEACE MANUAL, note 5 supra, 269 at 271) 
described very vividly the situation which makes safeguards a necessity in 
connection with any program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He 
said: "[T]he level of science and technique which has been reached at the 
present time makes it possible for the very application of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes to be utilized for increasing the production of atomic 
weapons." Mr. Molotov's solution to that problem was the restatement of 
the Soviet line calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons without safe-
guards. In a memorandum handed to Ambassador Zarubin by Assistant 
Secretary of State Merchant on July 9, 1954, (id., 274 at 276) the United 
States pointed out: "In reality, however, ways can be devised to safeguard 
against diversion of materials from power producing reactors. And there 
are forms of peaceful utiliza_tion in which no question of weapon grade 
material arises." On Sept. 22, 1954, the day before the opening of the 
General Assembly, Mr. Gromyko handed an aide-memoire to Ambassador 
Bohlen in Moscow (id., 278 at 281) stating: "The Soviet Government is 
ready to examine in course of further negotiations the United States Gov-
ernment's views on this question (safeguards)." 
In the 716th Session of the 9th General Assembly's First Committee on 
Nov. 15, 1954, Mr. Vyshinski emphasized the necessity of control provisions 
by referring to President Eisenhower's plan contained in his speech before 
the General Assembly of Dec. 8, 1953: " ... [A]lthough the plan had con-
tained no safeguards to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for 
peaceful purposes ... that did not mean that the Soviet Union considered 
it a bad one." (Emphasis added.) A/C.1/SR 716, p. 335 at 339. 
The note of the Soviet Union of Oct. I, 1955 to the American Embassy 
in Moscow called for an appropriate staff of inspectors to investigate atomic 
installations of the beneficiary states and to verify the use of materials and 
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equipment received from the Agency, such observations and control to be 
accomplished "with due observation of sovereign rights of the above-men-
tioned states and within the framework of an agreement between a given 
state and the Agency." United States Dept. of State Press Release No. 527, 
Oct. 6, 1956, p. 23. See statement of the Soviet representative in the First 
Committee of the 10th General Assembly, Oct. 11, 1955, U.N. GENERAL 
AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 10th Session (1955), First Committee, A/C.l/SR.759, 
p. 13 at 14. 
In its opening statement at the International Conference the Soviet 
Union representative, Mr. Zarubin, stated that" ... the conditions for con-
trol and inspection, which are contemplated in the agreements between the 
United States and other countries and in the draft statute, do, in our opin-
ion, infringe upon the sovereign rights of the recipient countries, and do 
therefore give rise to justified criticism on their part." IAEA/CS/OR.3, p. 31. 
In the following discussion on Agency safeguards, Mr. Zarubin said: "The 
delegation of the Soviet Union had already declared that it considered that 
a sufficient safeguard would be to abide by the provision of the statute 
which makes recipient states assume their obligation not to use the assist-
ance received for the production of nuclear weapons and to submit reports 
on the use to which the assistance given by the Agency has been put. The 
safeguards and controls which the draft statute provides would be signifi-
cant only if these provisions found their place within the framework of a 
general prohibition of nuclear weapons and if these guarantees and safe-
guards extended to all States, both the States receiving the assistance of the 
Agency and those supplying it. The application of safeguards to recipient 
countries alone-that is, in the first place, to under-developed countries-
falls short of the mark and imposes upon the recipient countries such con-
ditions of control and inspection as violate their sovereignty and which 
would no doubt slow down the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes in these countries." IAEA/CS/OR.36, pp. 6,7. 
APPENDIX H 
(footnote 76) 
India made three reservations to art. XII of the twelve-power draft. 
REPORT OF THE WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS, Annex IV, p. 3. First, the provi-
sions of the twelve-power draft and also of the final statute require the 
agreement between the Agency and states receiving fissionable materials 
from the Agency to provide for certain Agency rights and responsibilities 
"to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement.'' The Indians would 
have added to this that the safeguards should be required only as specifi-
cally provided for in individual agreements between the Agency and the 
members thereof, thus permitting agreements with less safeguards than 
those prescribed in the statute. While there was considerable discussion 
on this subject India never submitted a specific amendment to the Inter-
national Conference. 
796 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
The second reservation concerned art. XII, par. A, subpar. 3 requiring 
the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring 
accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced 
in the project or arrangement. The Indians would have amended the 
article to restrict accountability to fissionable materials supplied. This 
would have eliminated from accountability all of the source materials as 
well as plutonium or U-233, produced as by-products of the operation of 
the reactor. IAEA/CS/OR.7, p. 48 et seq. France joined India in advocat-
ing the removal of source materials from accountability. IAEA/CS/OR.24, 
p. 46 et seq. The third reservation (both the second and the third reser-
vations are contained in amendment IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 5 spon-
sored by Ceylon, Egypt, India and Indonesia) related to art. XII, par. A, 
subpar. 5, dealing with the chemical processing of fissionable materials and 
the disposition of plutonium and U-233 produced as a result of the reactor 
operations. The statute provided for complete Agency control over both 
the chemical processing of fuel elements and of the disposition of the fis-
sionable materials produced in the reactor. This is one of the crucial points 
in reactor operations where diversion to war uses can most readily take place. 
India called for considerably less stringent control in connection with the 
by-product materials that would be produced from a reactor. Under this 
suggestion, states would be able to stockpile the plutonium and U-233 pro-
duced in reactors for use within the state for peaceful purposes and under 
Agency safeguards. Under present technology there are few peaceful uses 
for plutonium and for U-233. The result of the Indian suggestions would 
be that substantial stockpiles of materials unusable for peacetime purposes 
would accumulate in many parts of the world. The United States regarded 
this as a serious potential threat to the peace. India insisted that under the 
original wording of the statute, the Agency would be in a position to dictate 
in perpetuity what fissionable materials would be allotted to all states; it 
was entirely possible that the Board of Governors of the Agency on the basis 
of political or economic considerations unrelated to international safety 
would prevent states from acquiring the fissionable materials necessary for 
development of their economic welfare. IAEA/CS/OR.28, p. 55 et seq. 
APPENDIX I 
(footnote 88) 
"Report of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration," 
Brussels, 1956, reprinted in University of Michigan Law School, Summer In-
stitute, WORKSHOPS oN LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC ENERGY (1956) 201 at 
212, sets forth the procedure for the proposed EURA TOM organization: 
"Regulations on (Restrictive) Allocation. 
(a) In all circumstances, fuels are placed at the disposal of users with-
out discrimination. · 
(b) If the Organization declares itself unable to deliver within a reason-
able period because of a shortage of supplies, it is obliged by that token to 
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recognize that a shortage exists and to carry out (restrictive) allocation. The 
allocation is made on the basis of current needs and not past reference 
periods. 
(c) Fissile materials produced in installations that are not common 
installations are reserved even in case of allocation for the enterprise pro-
ducing them or those for which they are destined under the programs 
binding these enterprises. Available surpluses can be ceded only to the 
Organization. 
(d) In order to encourage the search for resources, the users to whom 
the Organization declares that it cannot deliver because of insufficient supply 
have the right to make use of the offers that they have received from third 
countries; this right may be exercised under conditions to be defined, 
which preserve in any case the exercise of a strict control by the Organiza-
tion. In fact, this hypothesis has small chance to be realized under the 
actual supply conditions. 
These fundamental rules .must in every case be respected in the opera-
tions by which the Organization places nuclear ores and fuels at the dis-
posal of the user. 
These conditions may normally be satisfied even if the Organization 
buys, resells and repurchases after transformation or at the end of the 
process. However, it would make a practice of establishing a lease contract: 
-for materials it has itself obtained by lease; 
-for materials sold to it under conditions of non-resale; 
-if the user chooses to lease rather than to buy; 
-lastly, by decision of the Commission in the case of products such as 
fuels that are highly enriched or particularly dangerous for any other rea-
son; this decision taken for reasons of security with the agreement of the 
Council and subject to appeal before the Court applies to all users without 
discrimination. In fact, the security rules and the conditions for allocation 
described above will in the last analysis make the distribution of materials 
to users the subject of truly sui generis contracts." 
APPENDIX J 
(footnote 127) 
Art. XIV in pars. B and E in effect reduces to a minimum the occasions 
when the Agency would be justified in utilizing its borrowing powers under 
art. XIV, par. G. Theoretically, all of the expenditures coming under the 
administrative budget (par. B, subpar. I) will be apportioned among the 
members pursuant to par. D of art. XIV. All other expenditures will be 
met through a combination of revenue from a scale of charges (art. XIV, 
par. E) and voluntary contributions (donations). The Board of Governors 
is required to fix a scale of charges at least adequate (together with dona-
tions) to cover the operational expenditures described in par. B, subpar. 2. 
Indeed, it is contemplated that there might be an excess of revenue which 
would go into the general fund (see par. F of art. XIV) and thus be 
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available, for example, to meet a part of the cost of the safeguards system. 
On the other hand, the administrative expenses are likely to exceed the 
amounts that could be raised through apportionment among the members, 
especially if the administrative budget includes substantial sums for items 
such as the construction of safeguards facilities and storage costs for the 
"syphoned off" fissionable material not used for Agency projects. Statute, 
art. XIV, par. B, subpar. I (b), last clause. Could the words "the costs of 
handling and storage of special fissionable material" in that clause be in-
terpreted to include also the costs of building storage facilities for this 
material? Similarly, Agency facilities to be included in the operational 
budget under par. B, subpar. 2 may prove too expensive to be charged to 
the beneficiary members in accordance with art. XIV, par. E. It is these 
deficits which might be covered through borrowing. It seems probable that 
Agency borrowing would be directed primarily to that objective. Repay-
ment of loans would come from the General Fund of the Agency resulting 
from an excess of revenues arising from the scale of charges and from dona-
tions. If loans are used for administrative expenses they could presumably 
be repaid by apportionment among members. Presumably, loans to con-
struct facilities would be repaid over a period of years bearing some rela-
tionship to the life of the facilities. · 
The financing provisions were the subject of a lively discussion in the 
International Conference. The main point raised was the question as to 
who should be burdened with the financing of Agency facilities. See Mr. 
Zarubin (U.S.S.R.), IAEA/CS/OR.31, p. 11; Mr. Wershof (Canada), id. at 
16; Mr. Wadsworth (United States), id. at 26, and other statements in 
IAEA/CS/OR.31 and 32. 
